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Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the 
minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it 
propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective 
market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But 
boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often 
arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those 
costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. 
So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies 
have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” 
approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and 
assume that it represents the whole transaction. Yet real-world 
transactions often involve multiple layers of contracts, each with 
its own information costs. What is needed, then, is a “vertical” 
analysis, a study that examines fewer contracts of any one kind 
but tracks all the contracts the consumer encounters, soup to nuts. 
This Article presents the first vertical study of boilerplate. It 
casts serious doubt on the market mechanism and shows that 
existing scholarship fails to appreciate the full scale of the 
information cost problem. It then offers two regulatory solutions. 
The first works within contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, 
tweaking what the parties need to prove and who bears the burden 
of proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing 
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both sellers and consumers to confront and minimize boilerplate’s 
information costs—an approach I call “forced salience.” In the 
end, the boilerplate experience is as deep as it is wide. Our 
empirical work should reflect that fact, and our policy proposals 
should too. 
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I. Introduction 
Forget what your contracts professor told you about offers, 
counteroffers, and meetings of the minds. Most contracts are 
merely boilerplate—i.e., take-it-or-leave-it propositions. In 
theory, that’s fine because the same is true of most market 
transactions. We negotiate over almost nothing. No one haggles 
with a supermarket cashier over the price of a loaf of bread, or 
how thinly it is sliced, or whether it’s covered by a warranty. 
Instead, we rely on our collective power as consumers to drive 
unwanted terms (contractual or otherwise) out of the 
marketplace. Competition, not negotiation, is the answer. 
Scholars have observed for some time, however, that when it 
comes to boilerplate contracts, market competition may not work 
as well as theory would have us believe.1 Boilerplate, these 
observers maintain, is particularly resistant to market forces 
because of the high information costs it imposes on consumers: it 
often arrives late in the transaction, and once it arrives it often 
consists of overlong, impenetrable gobbledygook. This means that 
consumers routinely disregard boilerplate in their purchasing 
decisions, which in turn means that the market cannot be trusted 
to regulate it.2 
Recent empirical evidence supports this view. But the studies 
so far have all been “horizontal”—they examine a single stratum 
of boilerplate (e.g., an array of software licensing agreements) 
and assume that it represents the whole transaction. Such 
studies are certainly useful in that they reveal some of the 
information costs that boilerplate creates for consumers. But they 
capture only a single moment in time, one aspect of the overall 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 240–48 (1995); Robert A. Hillman, 
Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms 
Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 840–45 (2006); Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1203, 1217–44 (2003); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1225–27 (1983).  
 2. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law 
and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 601 (1990) (“[T]here 
generally will be too few informed consumers to produce a competitive market 
for contract terms.”). 
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consumer experience. A more realistic approach would recognize 
that a consumer’s ability to evaluate boilerplate is a function of 
the information costs of the entire purchase, soup to nuts. What 
is missing, then, is a “vertical” analysis—a study that examines 
fewer contracts of any one kind, but places the consumer’s 
encounter with those contracts in a more representative, real-
world context, in which the boilerplate represents part of the 
transaction rather than its entirety. In short, a horizontal study 
is a still life, whereas a vertical study is a film—a moving picture 
of the consumer’s entire transaction. 
This Article presents the results of the first-ever vertical 
study of boilerplate. The subject of the study, like the subject of 
the emerging empirics and the foundational case law in the field, 
is the computer industry. To gauge overall information costs, I 
purchased ordinary desktop computers from four major vendors, 
tallied every word of boilerplate to which I became contractually 
bound, and recorded the point in the transactions at which each 
term arrived. The result? An average of twenty-five different 
contracts, comprising almost as many words as a Harry Potter 
novel. And nine out of every ten of those boilerplate terms arrived 
late in the transaction, long after the seller had been paid. 
This study casts doubt on the law’s current approach to 
boilerplate terms, which is to enforce them whenever minimal 
disclosure and assent requirements have been satisfied.3 And 
when the study’s results are situated in the current scholarship, 
they show that even those who doubt the market’s efficacy fail to 
appreciate the full scale of the information cost problem. In the 
end, these observations lead me to offer two regulatory solutions. 
The first and more conventional consists of tweaks to the 
unconscionability doctrine—modest changes in what the parties 
need to prove under the doctrine and who bears the burden of 
proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing both 
sellers and consumers to confront and minimize the information 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1204 (“If the non-drafting party indicates 
his general assent to the form, courts will enforce the terms contained therein 
whether or not that party approves of the terms provided, understands those 
terms, has read them, or even has the vaguest idea what the terms might be 
about.”).  
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costs that boilerplate creates—an approach I call “forced 
salience.” 
Two clarifications before we continue. First, as the discussion 
so far implies, I use the term “boilerplate” to mean any written 
contract drafted by one party and not subject to revision by the 
other (what others variously call form contracts or contracts of 
adhesion).4 For my purposes, then, it does not matter whether 
boilerplate terms are the same across a given industry or whether 
they vary from seller to seller. As long as a seller’s contract is a 
take-it-or-leave-it proposition, it falls within my definition. 
Second, this Article examines information costs and their 
effect on the market from the point of view of the individual 
consumer—“bottom up,” so to speak. It therefore does not make 
“top down,” legislative-style judgments about what particular 
terms are bad for consumers as a class and should therefore be 
forbidden by fiat. Such judgments have their place, but this is an 
Article about boilerplate, not about arbitration clauses or class 
action waivers or hidden credit card fees (important though those 
topics are). Indeed, as we will see, even boilerplate that goes 
unread can contain provisions that benefit both parties, and it is 
not the province of the law to forbid such terms, even if they 
emerge from an impaired market.5 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes the 
current debate between those who believe that the market for 
boilerplate functions reasonably well and those who don’t, and it 
discusses emerging empirical evidence on the issue. Part III adds 
a new dimension to those empirics by presenting the results of 
my vertical study and demonstrating the overwhelming 
information costs that a real-world transaction imposes on 
consumers. Part IV uses this real-world perspective to review and 
reject two common defenses of boilerplate’s enforceability. 
Finally, Part V details my approach to regulating boilerplate in a 
world of vertical transactions. Take it or leave it. 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Rakoff supra note 1, at 1177 (listing characteristics of a “contract of 
adhesion”). 
 5. See infra Part V.A (discussing boilerplate as an example of the classic 
market for lemons). 
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II. The State of the Debate 
To understand why boilerplate’s information costs are 
important, one must first understand how consumers and 
boilerplate interact in the marketplace. I therefore begin by 
defining a core issue on which almost everyone agrees—namely, 
that the enforceability of boilerplate depends on how well the 
relevant market is functioning. I then describe how consumers’ 
information costs can threaten that market function. This will set 
the stage for Part III’s vertical study of boilerplate’s real-world 
information costs. 
A. The Common Ground: Contracts as Product Features 
Anyone who has taken (or taught) Contracts in law school is 
familiar with the typical reaction when the topic turns to 
contracts of adhesion. By that point in the semester, students 
have learned to think of a contract as a negotiated arrangement 
of parties’ personal preferences—a meeting of the minds, 
mediated by the give-and-take of offer and counteroffer. Then, 
suddenly, they encounter boilerplate and its adhesive terms, and 
they realize that in real life the vast majority of contracts are 
take-it-or-leave-it propositions. No negotiation takes place. No 
minds meet. One party gives; one party takes. Madness! 
If the market is functioning properly, however, these 
objections are unavailing. Nonnegotiable terms are the norm in 
the modern marketplace. Price is a prime example: consumers 
don’t usually negotiate over the price of the products they buy. 
Rather, price tends to be a take-it-or-leave-it term, and we trust 
that competition will punish those sellers that set theirs too 
high.6 Likewise, if a consumer desires a product feature that one 
                                                                                                     
 6. “Seller” is my shorthand for the party that introduces the boilerplate 
into the transaction. Obviously there are circumstances in which the buyer 
originates the contract, but this Article focuses on consumers, who will usually 
be buyers and will usually be contract “takers” rather than contract “givers.” In 
a similar vein, this Article limits its scope to consumers and the market failure 
that attends their contractual transactions. But it may well be the case that the 
market is no more adept at responding to the contractual preferences of 
sophisticated business entities than those of consumers. Many of the adhesion 
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seller does not provide (say, a sunroof on a rental car),7 the 
answer is not negotiation; the answer is that the consumer takes 
his or her business elsewhere—namely, to a competing seller that 
does offer that feature. 
Instead of relying on the individual power of negotiation, 
then, we rely on the collective power of competition to provide 
consumers with the array of product features they desire, at a 
price they are willing to pay. Why shouldn’t we approach 
boilerplate the same way?8 Let the market punish those sellers 
whose contracts are too onerous. Consumers will express their 
                                                                                                     
contracts that I encountered in my study would have applied equally to 
businesses or had a separate but equally complex contractual counterpart for 
such purchasers. And Mitu Gulati and Robert Scott have recently shown that 
even in the sovereign-debt market, where multibillion-dollar banks and hedge 
funds transact with nation-states, boilerplate language fails to respond to the 
parties’ clear preferences—a phenomenon that Gulati and Scott blame on a 
suspect familiar to this Article’s readers, namely “a business model that relies 
on herd behavior, fails to provide incentives for innovation and thus rises and 
falls on volume-based, cookie-cutter transactions.” G. Mitu Gulati & Robert E. 
Scott, Introduction: The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and 
the Limits of Contract Design 8 (Columbia Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 
410, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1945988; see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form 
Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 677, 680 (2007) [hereinafter Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis] 
(finding that “[end-user license agreements] associated with products targeted 
toward the general public are not significantly more pro-seller than the [end-
user license agreements] associated with business-oriented products”). 
 7. For some reason, cars (with and without sunroofs) tend to be the 
example of choice when discussing market responses to consumer preferences. 
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. 
L. REV. 679, 688 (using the example of a red sports car with a sunroof and 
standard transmission); Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1220 (using the example of 
different colored cars, each with different options available).  
 8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 144 (8th ed. 
2011) (“[W]hat is important is not whether there is haggling in every 
transaction but whether competition forces sellers to incorporate in their 
standard contracts terms that protect the purchasers.”); Robert A. Hillman & 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 442 (2002) (“[T]he aggregate decisions of many consumers 
can pressure businesses into providing an efficient set of contract terms in their 
standard forms.”); Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1209 (describing “the market 
discipline established by the ability of buyers to shop among sellers for the most 
desirable package of product attributes, including contract terms”); Rakoff, 
supra note 1, at 1251 (“[B]argaining is not essential . . . as long as shopping 
concerning the particular term takes place.”). 
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preferences by rejecting those terms in favor of more attractive 
terms offered by another seller. Unwanted boilerplate will simply 
disappear from the market, just as ridiculously high prices do.9 
In other words, a boilerplate term is merely a product 
feature—no different from price or a sunroof. The law would not 
normally regulate the price that a car rental company charges its 
customers or force it to offer sunroofs in its vehicles. For the same 
reason, the argument goes, the law should enforce a boilerplate 
contract without regard to its content. Let the market work it out. 
This notion of boilerplate as a product feature, regulated by 
market forces, has become a staple of both the scholarly 
literature and the case law. Scholars consistently equate contract 
terms to noncontractual attributes of a product.10 And perhaps 
the most well-known case on boilerplate, ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg,11 wholeheartedly embraced this idea in discussing 
the adhesive “terms of use” that the seller had included with its 
digital database software: 
Terms of use are no less a part of “the product” than are the 
size of the database and the speed with which the software 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1219 (explaining that the standard 
economic model assumes that consumers engage in a cost–benefit analysis of 
products before they buy and that such behavior drives out of the market all 
products with undesirable attributes or with production costs that are higher 
than buyers are willing to pay). 
 10. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
933, 933 (2006) (equating adhesion contracts to computer screens, 
microprocessors, and battery power); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the 
Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 214 (“There is no reason to 
distinguish contract terms from any other aspect of a product’s composition.”); 
David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of 
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 281 n.7 (1986) (“A contract can be 
regarded as another product attribute . . . .”); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as 
Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 147 (1970) (characterizing adhesion contracts as 
just one part of “a unitary, purchased bundle”); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1223, 1229 (2006) (noting the widespread assumption among symposium 
participants regarding “the collapse of any distinction between the product . . . 
on the one hand, and the contract . . . on the other”); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. 
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 671 (1979) (characterizing 
contract terms as “another product feature” and comparing them to “color 
varieties”). 
 11. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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compiles listings. Competition among vendors, not judicial 
revision of a package’s contents, is how consumers are 
protected in a market economy. . . . ProCD has rivals, which 
may elect to compete by offering superior software, monthly 
updates, improved terms of use, lower price, or a better 
compromise among these elements.12 
This widespread acceptance of boilerplate as just another 
product feature approach has occasioned a shift in the scholarly 
literature. Scholars no longer worry about individual negotiation; 
instead, they worry about whether ProCD’s assertion is correct: 
does competition among sellers over the terms of contracts 
adequately protect consumer interests? We turn to that question 
next. 
B. The Battleground: Market Function or Market Failure 
We have now seen that contract law and scholarship treat 
boilerplate as simply another product feature, which consumers 
are free to accept or reject according to their own preferences. 
Under this view, a functioning market will regulate the content of 
adhesive contracts just as it regulates other features, such as 
price. Enforceability of boilerplate accordingly depends on how 
well the market responds to consumer preferences regarding that 
“feature” of the transaction—the boilerplate’s terms. 
To evaluate the market’s responsiveness to the boilerplate 
“feature,” however, one must first understand how the market 
regulates the features of a product as a general matter. In an 
ideal world, a consumer identifies and evaluates all the features 
of a product, rating each against the others in an internal cost–
benefit calculus that reflects his or her particular preferences. So 
when evaluating a car rental, I decide how much each of the 
many product features matters to me, regardless of whether that 
feature is contractual in nature (e.g., mileage allotment, 
insurance coverage) or noncontractual (e.g., the model of the car, 
                                                                                                     
 12. Id. at 1453 (citation omitted). 
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its color, whether it has a sunroof).13 I then perform the same 
evaluation on the competing car rentals that the market offers. 
When I have evaluated all the rental offerings, I choose the 
one that most closely approaches my optimal balance of features, 
so as to maximize the utility I derive from the transaction—or I 
exit the market entirely, having failed to identify any option that 
justifies the price that the seller demands.14 Either choice sends a 
signal to the marketplace about what features I desire and how 
much I am willing to pay for them, and that signal is combined 
with the signals from other consumers to produce an efficient 
array of market options.15 
This idealized model, known as “compensatory” 
decisionmaking,16 makes many assumptions about consumer 
behavior. Most important, it assumes that consumers are capable 
of both acquiring the information they need and then processing 
that information in a sophisticated cost–benefit analysis, under 
which the merits of unrelated features like sunroofs and 
insurance policies are reduced to some common utility metric 
(price, presumably) by which they can be compared and traded off 
                                                                                                     
 13. In a sense, of course, the latter features could also be considered 
contractual, in that the rental agency promises to provide a car with those 
features. But the “contractual” label here is meant to capture the more abstract, 
intangible kinds of promises, which are often found in boilerplate. 
 14. Shoshana Shiloh et al., Individual Differences in Compensatory 
Decision-Making Style and Need for Closure as Correlates of Subjective Decision 
Complexity and Difficulty, 30 PERSONALITY & INDIV. DIFFS. 699, 701 (2001) (“A 
compensatory strategy entails that the alternative chosen is superior to the 
other alternatives in the sum of the weighted utilities of all the attributes 
considered, and leads to maximization of utilities—the main criterion of 
normative decision making.”). For a more detailed (and quite excellent) 
explanation of this idealized process in a contracts context, see Korobkin, supra 
note 1, at 1219–22. 
 15. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The 
Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 638 (1996) (explaining that in an ideal world with perfect 
information, contracts “will contain only efficient terms . . . because all of the 
terms will, by definition, be fully understood and properly valued”). 
 16. See Shiloh et al., supra note 14, at 701 (explaining that “compensatory” 
decisionmaking means that “the decision maker clarifies objectives, surveys an 
array of alternatives, searches for relevant information, assimilates information 
in an unbiased manner, and evaluates alternatives carefully before making a 
choice”). 
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against one another.17 As discussed below, both assumptions are 
suspect. 
1. Information Acquisition 
The first flaw in the idealized model of compensatory 
decisionmaking is that it assumes that consumers can efficiently 
acquire the necessary information about the options the market 
offers. 
Suppose I want to rent a car with two particular features: I 
want it to be reliable and I want it to have a sunroof. It is 
relatively easy to distinguish cars that have sunroofs from those 
that do not. It might be harder to determine whether a car is 
reliable. And if the cost of acquiring information about reliability 
exceeds the value I attach to that feature, I will make my decision 
without regard to reliability.18 It is rational for me to do so, given 
the cost of information acquisition, but my choice nevertheless 
sends the wrong signal to the marketplace because the 
information acquisition cost prevented me from expressing my 
preference with regard to reliability. 
If we view a boilerplate contract as just another product 
feature, then the information acquisition problem requires us to 
examine how difficult it is for consumers to learn the terms of the 
contract and make compensatory judgments accordingly. 
Contract law has several mechanisms that address this issue, 
such as the requirement that terms be reasonably certain before 
a contract is formed,19 the distinction between an acceptance and 
a counteroffer,20 and limitations on the modification of contracts 
after formation.21 In various ways, these mechanisms mediate the 
tension between the need to arrive at a meaningful agreement 
                                                                                                     
 17. Grether et al., supra note 10, at 287 (“Consumers could fail to choose 
the best because of high costs of acquiring information about market choices . . . 
or because of high costs of processing information about market choices . . . .”). 
 18. See id. at 287–88 (explaining that “even rational consumers fail to 
consider all options in the face of high information costs”).  
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981). 
 20. Id. § 59. 
 21. Id. § 89. 
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and the fact that all contracts are incomplete—i.e., that some 
contractual terms are unknown or become known only after the 
parties are heavily invested in the transaction.22 
Despite these existing doctrinal mechanisms, there is 
compelling evidence that current contract law does not 
adequately address consumers’ information acquisition costs, 
such that consumers often cannot engage in compensatory 
decisionmaking with regard to the boilerplate terms that 
accompany many common transactions. Indeed, the significance 
of those costs has been one of the most hotly contested topics in 
contract case law and scholarship over the last fifteen years.23 
On one side of the debate are those who have no objection to 
delaying the availability of boilerplate terms until other aspects 
of the transaction are well underway. The best example of this 
approach is, again, Judge Easterbrook’s famous ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg,24 which stands for the proposition that contractual 
terms withheld from a consumer until late in the transaction are 
nevertheless enforceable, as long as the consumer had a chance to 
return the product if the terms were not acceptable.25 After all, 
the argument goes, consumers know that modern transactions 
often come with boilerplate attached.26 Some courts have followed 
ProCD, and some scholars have defended it.27 
In other quarters, however, ProCD’s belief in a functioning 
market has not been as well received. The main objection is that 
even if the late-arriving boilerplate gives consumers the option to 
                                                                                                     
 22. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 299–
301 (2004) (discussing incomplete contracts).  
 23. See sources cited infra notes 24–29. 
 24. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 25. Id. at 1452. 
 26. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (7th Cir. 
1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (following ProCD and noting that late-arriving 
boilerplate contains terms that consumers value as part of the transaction). 
 27. For courts, see, e.g., id. at 1148–49; Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. 
Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2006); i.Lan Sys., Inc. 
v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002). For 
scholars, see, e.g., Eric A. Posner, ProCD v Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload 
in Contractual Bargaining, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1194 (2010) (“[ProCD] will 
be remembered as a masterpiece of realist judging, one of the great opinions in 
the canon of contract law cases.”). 
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reject its terms, by that point they have invested too much time 
and attention to return the product (i.e., reject the “offer”) and go 
back to square one. For example, in ProCD’s world, consumers 
who want to comparison-shop for personal computers must 
purchase a computer, bring it home, and search it for boilerplate 
(both within its box and once it is started up)—and then must 
repeat this process for each and every computer they are 
considering.28 This imposes arguably insuperable information 
acquisition costs, and, for this reason, many commentators and 
several courts have rejected ProCD and argued against the 
enforceability of late-arriving boilerplate.29 
As we will see below, a common response to the problem of 
information acquisition costs is to require the disclosure of 
                                                                                                     
 28. Cf. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (relying on ProCD to enforce contractual 
terms found in the box of a mail-order computer). 
 29. For courts, see, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 
1339–41 (D. Kan. 2000) (discussing why the court was not persuaded to follow 
the reasoning used in Hill and ProCD); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 
25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230–31, 1230 n.17 (D. Utah. 1997) (following the 
“majority” position that late-arriving shrinkwrap licenses are invalid “contracts 
of adhesion, unconscionable, and/or unacceptable pursuant to the U.C.C.”), 
vacated on other grounds, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. 
Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 282 Kan. 365, 377–78 (2006) (adhering to “traditional 
contract principles” and treating shrinkwrap agreements as a proposal to 
modify the terms of the contract pursuant to UCC 2-209). For commentators, 
see, e.g., Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the Courts: 
The Case Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for 
Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753, 755 [hereinafter Braucher, Decision to Trust 
the Courts] (arguing that a buyer does not agree to a seller’s delayed mass-
market terms); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of 
Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 110–11 (1997) (arguing that agreements 
received so late in the transaction dissuade consumers from rejecting the terms 
because of the high transaction costs already endured by the consumer); 
Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1265 (arguing against enforcement of late-arriving 
boilerplate because buyers, “[a]fter the purchase, . . . [have] already invested in 
the particular products, and returning them would . . . require[] expending 
additional time and effort”). Note that the sunk cost effect might cause an actual 
consumer to be even less likely to return the computer than the theoretical 
rational consumer. Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer 
Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 129 (2007) (“Since the efforts to 
become familiar with the transaction’s details are sunk, a natural tendency, 
according to the framework proposed by behavioral law and economics, is to 
ignore potentially adverse terms that the [standard form contract] may contain, 
although this tendency is irrational according to traditional law and 
economics.”). 
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boilerplate earlier in the transaction. Such an approach can 
indeed substantially decrease those costs—a necessary and 
welcome step towards a functioning market. It is not, however, 
sufficient all on its own. Something else stands in the way, a 
second and even more problematic shortcoming of the idealized 
model of compensatory decisionmaking: the cost of processing 
information about a product. It is to that issue that we now turn. 
2. Information Processing 
The second flaw in the idealized model of compensatory 
decisionmaking has to do with consumers’ ability to process 
information once they acquire it. Even if information about each 
product and all its features is available, such that information 
acquisition costs are low, consumers frequently lack the capacity 
to evaluate that information and express their preferences 
accordingly. 
The problem here is information overload. Again, the car 
rental example: Rental cars come in many shapes and sizes, with 
a variety of features (both contractual and not): make, model, 
color, transmission, mileage allotment, insurance coverage, and 
more. Compensatory decisionmaking would require me to decide 
how much each feature matters, rate it against the other 
features, produce some sort of aggregate score, and then do the 
same for the many other rental options the market offers. 
This is a demanding information processing task. I must 
make a high number of feature-to-feature comparisons and then 
account for both the gradations of difference among them and the 
value I attach to each such gradation. Do I value a sunroof more 
than an automatic transmission? If so, by how much? And that’s 
just two features. Contemplate the added complexity that would 
come with a third—say, color. Would I choose an orange car with 
a sunroof and manual transmission over a blue car with no 
sunroof and an automatic transmission? 
One can see how quickly the cost of processing such 
information rises as market options expand. Consider the variety 
of choices available for everyday purchases like food: 
An ordinary supermarket contains 285 varieties of cookies, 
including 21 chocolate chip options alone; 20 different types of 
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Goldfish crackers; 13 “sports drinks,” 65 “box drinks,” and 85 
flavors of juice; a dozen varieties of Pringles potato chips; 80 
pain relievers; 40 lipstick shades; 16 varieties of instant 
mashed potatoes, 75 different instant gravies, and 120 
different pasta sauces; 175 different salad dressings; and a 
whopping 275 types of cereal.30 
And keep in mind that not only is there often a huge number of 
competing products, but the products differ from one another 
along multiple dimensions such that each has multiple features 
to be weighed and compared. Do I want low-fat, Chewy Chips 
Ahoy or Double-Stuf Oreos?31 
Not surprisingly, then, empirical studies show that, for all 
but the most basic transactions, the cost of processing 
information makes compensatory decisionmaking a mere pipe 
dream.32 Consumers abandon a purely compensatory strategy 
when faced with as few as six options,33 process no more than five 
                                                                                                     
 30. Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When 
Choice Impairs Social Welfare, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 24, 26 (2004). 
 31. The correct answer is the Oreos. 
 32. See Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 432, 435 (1984) 
[T]he key finding to emerge [from studies of consumer 
decisionmaking] is that consumers stop far short of overloading 
themselves. They tend to examine only small proportions of the brand 
and attribute information that is available. . . . Few findings 
regarding consumer behavior have proven to be as consistent across 
so many different procedures, contexts, products, investigators, and 
so on. 
See also Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision 
Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419, 427 (1982) (summarizing studies that show—
with remarkable consistency—a decline in optimal decisionmaking after the 
number of data inputs exceeds ten). These findings seem to be offshoots of the 
theory of the “magic number seven,” the conclusion from cognitive science that 
people generally cannot retain and process more than approximately seven bits 
of information in their short-term memories. See George A. Miller, The Magical 
Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing 
Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 95 (1956) (synthesizing research on 
information processing in different contexts and concluding that “the span of 
absolute judgment and the span of immediate memory impose severe limitations 
on the amount of information that we are able to receive, process, and 
remember”). 
 33. Denis A. Lussier & Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and 
Contingent Processing in Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 154, 164 (1979). 
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features of any particular option,34 and make decisions essentially 
at random when faced with just four options that have four 
features each.35 And the low levels of complexity at issue in these 
studies do not even begin to represent the amount of information 
that consumers frequently encounter in the real world.36 
Moreover, not only is it clear that the typical consumer can only 
process a limited (and surprisingly small) amount of product 
information, but there is also some empirical evidence that, once 
that limit is reached, providing more information and options is 
worse than useless: it may actually reduce the consumer’s ability 
to make the right choice.37 
                                                                                                     
 34. Id. at 162; see also Malhotra, supra note 32, at 423 (“[T]he probability of 
correct choice decreases significantly as the number of attributes on which 
information is provided increases from five to 15, 20, or 25.”). 
 35. Grether et al., supra note 10, at 297. Grether and his co-authors 
curiously conclude that these findings support the proposition that “consumers 
do not experience serious problems as a result of the amount of information that 
markets and the state now generate,” id. at 294—a conclusion for which other 
commentators rightly take them to task. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text 
Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308–09 (1986); Roberta Romano, A Comment on 
Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their Implications for Public 
Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 317 (1986).  
 36. The largest of the studies involve options that number in the teens or 
twenties, with a similar number of features per option. E.g., Malhotra, supra 
note 32, at 420 (twenty-five options with up to twenty-five features). As Jacob 
Jacoby points out in commenting on a sixteen-option, sixteen-feature study, the 
real world presents consumers with considerably more information than that. 
See Jacoby, supra note 32, at 434 (noting that there are approximately 150 
cereal brands on the market and their packaging can contain over 100 items of 
information). 
 37. See Kristin Diehl, When Two Rights Make a Wrong: Searching Too 
Much in Ordered Environments, 42 J. MKTG. RES. 313, 314 (2005) (listing 
reasons why more information can lead to worse decisions); Sheena S. Iyengar & 
Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation, 
94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 533–34 (2010) (finding small but significant negative 
effect on 401(k) investment decisions as employees were offered more fund 
options); Sheena Sethi-Iyengar et al., How Much Choice Is Too Much? 
Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: 
NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 83, 88–91 (Olivia S. Mitchell & 
Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004) (finding a 1.5% to 2% decrease in employee 401(k) 
participation for every ten funds added to plan); Paul Slovic, Toward 
Understanding and Improving Decisions, in 2 HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND 
PRODUCTIVITY: INFORMATION PROCESSING AND DECISION MAKING 157, 168 
(William C. Howell & Edwin A. Fleishman eds., 1982) (reporting study in which 
horse-race handicappers’ predictions failed to improve and actually became 
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So how do consumers respond to these insuperable 
information costs? They simplify, usually by identifying just a few 
salient, easily processed features and focusing on those, or at 
least using them as a screening device to reduce the number of 
products under consideration to a more manageable level at 
which compensatory comparison is possible. They try to make a 
satisfactory choice by sacrificing inquiry into certain features in 
favor of pursuing inquiry into few, salient others—an approach 
known as “satisficing.”38 
Replacing a purely compensatory approach with a satisficing 
strategy makes sense for consumers. Indeed, they may have no 
other choice, given their inherent cognitive limitations and the 
presence of so much information in the marketplace. But 
satisficing has important implications for whether we can rely on 
the market to adequately account for consumer preferences. After 
all, by definition satisficing results in something other than an 
optimal expression of consumer preferences.39 In other words, if a 
particular product feature does not make the cut during the 
satisficing process—i.e., if it is not one of the features that are 
salient to consumers when they screen available options—then 
there is less reason to believe that the market is sending the right 
signal to sellers about the desirability of that feature.40 
                                                                                                     
more inconsistent as available information increased); see also Jeffrey Davis, 
Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical 
Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 
847–49 (1977) (citing studies).  
 38. Grether et. al, supra note 10, at 287–88. The term satisficing was 
coined by Herbert Simon, one of the godfathers of behavioral economics, in 
Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 
PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 136 (1956). 
 39. Over the years, different commentators have used different definitions 
of satisficing. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 214–15 (defining satisficing 
as searching until one finds an option that meets certain predetermined criteria 
at which point the choice is made and the search stops); Grether et al., supra 
note 10, at 287–88 (defining satisficing as used in main text above); see also 
Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1223–25 (describing various simplifying strategies 
that consumers use in response to information processing costs). For present 
purposes, these distinctions make no difference because they all stand for the 
proposition that, in the real world, consumers depart from compensatory 
decisionmaking. 
 40. See Botti & Iyengar, supra note 30, at 27 (“[T]he objective of reducing 
the cognitive costs involved in making the choice can produce suboptimal 
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What do information processing costs mean for boilerplate? 
According to contract law, very little. Courts and legislatures 
tend to assume that the problem, if any, is information 
acquisition, and thus that early disclosure of terms is all that 
consumers need.41 Other than the anemic doctrine of 
unconscionability (to which we will return later),42 current law is 
largely silent on the issue.43 
The law may be silent, but a chorus of commentators has 
argued that information processing costs can routinely prohibit 
the reading of boilerplate even when it is provided early in the 
transaction.44 And empirical studies (mostly of the software 
industry) have begun to confirm this suspicion that information 
acquisition is only half of the problem. One study of more than six 
hundred software contracts found a lack of correlation between 
competitive market conditions and the content of boilerplate 
                                                                                                     
decisions and subsequent dissatisfying outcomes.”); Naresh K. Malhotra, 
Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision 
Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436, 438 (1984) (“While consumers may employ 
heuristics to limit the intake of information, these heuristics may often involve a 
tradeoff between simplifying and optimizing.”). Even those who have strong 
faith in the market admit that satisficing departs from the optimal. E.g., 
Grether et al., supra note 10, at 287 (noting that a consumer engaged in 
satisficing could make a choice “that fails to include the consumer’s most 
preferred product—the one which would be chosen if every product in the 
market were inspected”). 
 41. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 657–58 (2011) (reviewing the law on 
mandatory disclosure of contract terms). 
 42. See infra Part V.A. 
 43. The incapacity doctrine is one way in which contract law already 
accepts the proposition that cognitive ability should play a role in enforceability, 
at least at the extreme. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 212–13 (“[T]he doctrine 
of capacity rests on the ‘assumption that incompetents, properly defined, require 
protection from their own actions,’ so that the premise of the bargain principle, 
that a contracting party will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his 
subjective expected utility, is not fulfilled.” (footnote omitted)). For a 
comprehensive review of contract doctrines that address information processing 
costs for boilerplate, see Hillman & Rachlinksi, supra note 8, at 454–60. 
 44. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 247; Gillette, supra note 7, at 682; 
Hillman, supra note 1, at 850; Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1217; Rakoff, supra 
note 1, at 1226. 
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terms,45 suggesting that boilerplate does not respond to 
competitive pressures.46 And in a study of online software 
purchases, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler tracked one month of 
Internet click-stream data for 47,399 website visitors.47 Her 
finding? Even if the seller forces consumers to click “I agree” and 
provides a direct link to the boilerplate, only one in every two 
hundred consumers reads it—and that’s under a very liberal 
definition of “read” that includes any consumer that spends at 
least one second on the page where the adhesive terms are 
available.48 (Relaxing these limitations led to an even lower 
reading rate.)49 
                                                                                                     
 45. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard 
Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 447, 451 (2008). In fact, a competitive market might be worse for 
consumers; monopolists can afford to offer decent contract terms, whereas 
“competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and misperceptions of their 
customers.” Oren Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: A Behavioral 
Economics Account 2 (NYU Ctr. Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 11-42, 
2011). 
 46. A related study found that boilerplate that was available early in the 
transaction was no more pro-consumer than boilerplate that arrived later, 
suggesting that lowering the costs of information acquisition does not 
necessarily lead to different contract terms. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are 
“Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software 
License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 333 (2009). Of course, this finding 
might be read to show that all boilerplate is responsive to consumer preferences, 
rather than that no boilerplate is. And the study’s absolute measure of “pro-
consumer” versus “pro-seller” should be taken with a grain of salt because it 
uses the methodology from an earlier study in which the maximum pro-
consumer score for a contract was six and the maximum pro-seller score was 
seventeen. Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6. Nevertheless, for 
comparative purposes—determining whether one contract is more pro-consumer 
than another—the methodology is sufficiently reliable. 
 47. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 167 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 106–10 (2012) [hereinafter Marotta-
Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?]. 
 48. See id. at 108 (finding that only 0.52% of such consumers spend more 
than one second on the contract web page); see also id. at 110 (concluding that 
“the primary cost [to consumers] lies not in locating and accessing EULAs, but 
rather in reading and assessing contract terms”). 
 49. See id. at 108 (finding a rate of only 0.13% when the boilerplate is not 
directly called to the consumer’s attention and 0.00% when it takes more than 
one click of the mouse to locate it). 
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This, in sum, is the boilerplate problem. If a contract term is 
merely a product feature, then more terms mean more features. 
More features mean more complexity. More complexity increases 
the use of satisficing strategies that eliminate boilerplate from 
consumers’ decisionmaking calculus. And if consumers routinely 
eliminate boilerplate from their decisionmaking, the justification 
for its enforcement—the protection of the marketplace through 
the collective power of competition—goes away. 
III. A Vertical Study of Boilerplate 
We have now seen that the problem of information costs 
casts doubt on whether the market registers consumer 
preferences regarding boilerplate. We have also seen some 
emerging empirics that suggest that this concern is more than 
theoretical. In this Part, I offer a different lens through which to 
view the boilerplate problem: a “vertical” study that 
contextualizes both information acquisition and information 
processing within the realities of consumer decisionmaking. 
A. Verticality’s Advantages 
The existing empirical studies that examine information 
costs in the world of boilerplate share one important limitation: 
they examine one stratum of individual contracts, all of a kind, 
and assume that this single contract defines the entire 
transaction.50 Even the click-stream study, which tracked actual 
consumer interactions with boilerplate, limited itself to 
interactions with a single kind of contract in a simple one-off 
transaction (the purchase of a stand-alone item of software).51 
                                                                                                     
 50. See studies cited supra notes 6, 45–49. This is not meant as a criticism; 
those studies were designed to measure something other than the overall 
consumer experience. For example, one study was primarily interested in 
identifying the balance of pro-seller versus pro-consumer terms. Marotta-
Wurgler, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6, at 679.  
 51. See Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, supra note 47 
(examining software licensing agreements in the context of purchasing a single 
item of software). The issue is not that the click-stream study focuses only on 
software licensing; the issue is that by focusing on any one kind of contract and 
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That sort of “horizontal” analysis is revealing, but its focus on 
a single kind of contract, and nothing else, means that it 
sacrifices depth for breadth. In contrast, a “vertical” analysis 
would look at fewer contracts of any one kind, but would situate 
the consumer’s encounter with those contracts in the real world—
an encounter in which the boilerplate is only part of a 
transaction, not its entirety. Consider software licensing. 
Sometimes consumers encounter software boilerplate in the sort 
of one-off horizontal context that earlier studies have focused 
on.52 But other times they encounter software boilerplate as part 
of an overall shopping experience, an experience that also 
presents noncontractual features to be evaluated, and indeed 
often involves multiple vendors and multiple contracts.53 
Measuring the consumer experience vertically, from top to 
bottom, therefore provides a uniquely instructive view of 
information costs and the tradeoffs that consumers make in 
deciding which features to evaluate and when. 
In other words, a horizontal study tells us something about 
the practices of a given industry, but it tells us less about the 
consumer experience in dealing with that industry and the true 
information costs that the industry imposes on consumers. A 
vertical study can overcome that deficiency. After all, if 
boilerplate is just one feature of a product, then a consumer’s 
ability to acquire and process information about boilerplate is not 
a function of the complexity of any one contract. It is a function of 
the complexity of the entire transaction, soup to nuts. Therefore, 
if we want to know when in the transaction the consumer 
                                                                                                     
assuming that it represents the totality of the transaction, one can draw only 
limited conclusions about consumer ability to acquire and process information in 
a real-world context. 
 52. Thus the saying in the software world, “The license is the product.” See, 
e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the 
Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 891, 896 (1998) (“For most software products, the license is the 
product; the computer program provides functionality to the user, but the 
license delivers the use rights.”). 
 53. See Leff, supra note 10, at 146–47 (noting that “when one stands far 
enough back from the whole deal, from the whole process of goods buying, what 
one sees is a unitary, purchased bundle” and that boilerplate is just one part of 
“the whole ‘set’”). 
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encounters boilerplate (a factor of vital importance to information 
acquisition costs) and how much total transactional complexity 
the consumer encounters (a factor of vital importance to 
information processing costs), a vertical study is the way to go.54 
What would such a study look like? As explained in more 
detail below, my approach was to purchase personal computers 
and measure both the volume of boilerplate (the “how much” 
factor) that came with them, and the point in the transactions at 
which I encountered each bit of boilerplate (the “when” factor). I 
chose this approach for four reasons. 
First, a computer purchase is exactly the kind of transaction 
that shows the advantages of a vertical analysis. From the 
consumer’s point of view, buying a computer is a single 
transaction, with a one-time, lump-sum price term. Yet the 
product to be purchased presents the consumer with many 
different features that emerge at different points in time. 
Examining such a transaction therefore allows one to track both 
the “when” and the “how much” aspects of information cost. 
Second, most of the scholarship and case law in this area 
focuses on the computer industry. Indeed, some of the 
foundational cases on consumers and boilerplate specifically 
involve computer purchases.55 Therefore, regardless of one’s 
views on the study’s broader application, it is germane to an 
important debate in the field—and to an industry that generates 
around $50 billion annually from such purchases.56 
Third, a computer purchase involves a high degree of 
contractual complexity. It thus demonstrates the critical role that 
information costs play in boilerplate’s enforceability. One can 
                                                                                                     
 54. Of course, a vertical case study of this kind constitutes just one 
example of a consumer’s encounter with boilerplate. In a sense, then, this 
approach is the mirror opposite of the horizontal approach in that it sacrifices 
breadth for depth. 
 55. E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Klocek 
v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000). 
 56. The recent economic downturn has affected personal computer sales, 
dropping domestic earnings from $51.3 billion in 2007 to a low of $45.8 billion in 
2009. DATAMONITOR, PCS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2011). But the numbers 
have begun to bounce back, with $47.2 billion earned in 2010—and volume rose 
steadily even during the recession, from 62.4 million units in 2006 to 75.7 
million in 2010. Id. at 10–11. 
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imagine transactions with comparable vertical complexity (for 
example, a vacation package that includes flights, hotels, tours, 
and of course a rental car), as well as transactions that are much 
simpler (for example, buying a loaf of bread). But as we will see in 
Part V,57 part of my thesis is that the enforceability of boilerplate 
should vary with the overall complexity of the transaction, and 
starting with an example that involves high complexity helps 
drive that point home. 
Finally, contracts and complexity are inextricably 
intertwined in the market for information goods. Sellers have 
significant incentives to offer merchandise that, like a computer 
system, comprises many different products that could have been 
sold separately—and to then use boilerplate to restrict 
consumers’ resale of the individual products within. This 
strategy, known as bundling, allows sellers to sell a set of goods 
to consumers at a unitary price even though particular 
consumers attach disparate values to the set’s individual 
components.58 For example, the Microsoft Office Home and 
Student suite, available for $150, contains four separate 
programs (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and OneNote).59 Some 
consumers may value Word, Excel, and PowerPoint at $40 each 
and OneNote at $30, whereas others value Word, Excel, and 
PowerPoint at $30 each and OneNote at $60. Selling the suite at 
$150 satisfies both groups and generates more surplus than could 
be gained from selling the same consumers each program as a 
                                                                                                     
 57. In particular, see the discussion of procedural unconscionability in Part 
V.A. 
 58. Nobel laureate George Stigler first introduced this concept in George J. 
Stigler, United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. CT. 
REV. 152, 152 (1963) (discussing the strategy as employed through the concept 
of “block-booking” of movies). The “bundling” label came later. See, e.g., Yannis 
Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and 
Efficiency, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1613, 1613 (1999) (studying the strategy of “bundling” 
a large number of information goods). 
 59. See Buy Microsoft Office 2010, MICROSOFT, http://office.microsoft. 
com/en-us/buy/buy-office-2010-FX101843016.aspx?WT.mc_id=ODC_ENUS_OAT 
ExcelHome_MonBuy (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (listing the “one household, three 
PCs” price) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Microsoft 
Office example appears in CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: 
A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 75–76 (1998). 
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standalone product at a unitary price.60 But for bundling to 
succeed, the seller must be able to prevent arbitrage;61 the 
strategy will not work if, for example, a consumer who values 
OneNote at $30 can unbundle it from the suite and resell it as a 
standalone program to a consumer who values it at $60.62 Enter 
boilerplate, which restricts consumers from doing that exact 
thing. 
For these reasons, then, a vertical study of the information 
costs inherent in the purchase of an entire computer system can 
teach us a lot about boilerplate enforceability in the real world. 
To such a study we now turn. 
B. Study Design 
The subject matter of the study was the purchase of desktop 
computers from the four top sellers of Windows-based computer 
systems (Acer, Dell, HP, and Toshiba), which together make up 
two-thirds of the domestic computer market.63 Each order 
comprised just a single basic desktop unit and the software and 
accessories that were included in the base price; any additional 
hardware, software, or other option that required additional fees 
was declined. I paid in full at the time the system was ordered, 
had it shipped, opened the box, set it up, and started up various 
                                                                                                     
 60. Microsoft sells the components individually as well as in a suite—a 
practice known as “mixed bundling.” See William James Adams & Janet L. 
Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475, 
475 (1976). The standalone versions, however, are sold at a significant markup. 
See Buy Microsoft Office 2010, supra note 59 (listing OneNote at $80 and the 
other components at $140). 
 61. See Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 58, at 1614 (noting that one of the 
conditions for analyzing bundling as a device for price discrimination is “no 
reselling”). 
 62. Id.  
 63. See Gartner, Inc., Gartner Says Worldwide PC Shipments in Fourth 
Quarter of 2011 Declined 1.4 Percent; Year-End Shipments Increased 0.5 Percent 
(Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1893523 (last visited Feb. 
4, 2013) (showing HP market share at 23.1%, Dell at 22.4%, Toshiba at 10.7%, 
and Acer at 9.8%, for a total of 66.0%) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Due to funding limitations, the other major vendor (Apple, at 11.6%) 
was not included. 
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programs that came with it. All along the way, I kept track of the 
boilerplate I encountered—every contract term that was 
presented to me in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion.64 
The most difficult part of the study design was deciding 
which contracts should count. In the Dell purchase, for example, I 
collected data on 186 different potential contracts. But 
determining which of those 186 should be included in my tally 
required two judgment calls. 
1. Assumptions About Enforceability 
The first and most important judgment call was to decide 
which of the various terms I encountered would be viewed as 
enforceable under current law. My goal was to be very 
conservative—to include only those contracts that a court would 
enforce without any real controversy. I achieved this goal through 
the use of two narrowly conceived enforcement criteria: the 
acceptance criterion and the availability criterion. 
The acceptance criterion meant that I counted only those 
contracts to which I had clearly and affirmatively manifested 
assent.65 Usually this assent took the form of the classic “I agree” 
or “I accept” mouse click—the classic “click-wrap” contract.66 So, 
for example, at the end of Dell’s online order process I 
encountered the screen depicted in Figure 1, which asked me to 
affirmatively manifest agreement to Dell’s Terms and Conditions 
of Sale. Any court would find that selecting the “I AGREE” option 
and then submitting the order, as I did, was a manifestation of 
                                                                                                     
 64. This meant that contractual terms for which I had an array of options 
(for example, shipping) were not included in the tally. 
 65. Some courts have upheld adhesion contracts without explicit 
manifestations of assent. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 
1150 (7th Cir. 1997). But I applied an explicit acceptance criterion because other 
cases suggest that terms that arrive after purchase are binding only if 
acceptance is unequivocal. See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 
1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000). 
 66. The origin of the term click-wrap is obscure, but it at least dates back to 
1996. See Koh Su Haw, E-Commerce: Technology Can Bypass the Legal Pitfalls, 
BUS. TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 14, 1996, at 16 (defining “click-wrap”). 
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assent to be bound.67 Those Terms and Conditions of Sale 
therefore counted in my tally.  
Figure 1 
 
In contrast, the bottom of the screen in Figure 1 contained 
some classic, barely perceptible “fine print” (e.g., “Offers subject 
to change.”) in gray font on a black background. These terms 
were not included in my analysis. Although some courts would 
undoubtedly enforce them, the lack of an affirmative 
manifestation of assent meant that enforceability was too 
uncertain to merit inclusion under my conservative 
assumptions.68 Similarly, some courts would enforce the various 
policies that one could access by clicking on the hyperlinks above 
                                                                                                     
 67. See Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of 
Click-Wrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 583 (2007) (“[C]ourts have almost 
uniformly found assent when the user clicks while having notice of the terms.”). 
 68. E.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 19–30 (2d Cir. 
2002) (finding no online contract formation when assent was ambiguous and 
terms were relegated to the bottom of the web page). 
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the fine print (e.g., “© 2010 Dell” and “Limited Warranty”)69—but 
not all courts would do so,70 so I did not count them either. The 
same goes for the hyperlinks indicated by the arrow in Figure 2; 
those links were prominently displayed next to a contract to 
which I did clearly manifest assent (the Terms and Conditions of 
Sale), but it was not clear that acceptance of the latter 
constituted acceptance of the additional contractual terms that 
one would reach by following those links, so I did not include 
them in my tally. 
My second criterion, availability, meant that the terms to 
which I manifested assent had to be easily accessible if they were 
to count in the overall tally. In the online context, it is common 
for contract terms to be located on a separate web page from the 
assent mechanism, rather than being forced upon the user as 
part of that mechanism.71 Figure 1’s reference to Dell’s Terms 
and Conditions of Sale provides an example; those terms were 
available with a single click of a mouse on the prominent 
hyperlink next to “I AGREE.” To remain conservatively 
consistent with the relevant case law, I counted such terms only 
if one could follow the given hyperlink (or nonhyperlinked web 
address) and find them no more than two web pages away.72 In 
                                                                                                     
 69. E.g., Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963, 2009 WL 586513, at 
*4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (finding defendant bound by browse-wrap agreement 
even absent affirmative assent because “[a] link to the full text of the user 
agreement is found at the bottom of the very web page that [defendant used]” 
and “[t]he user agreement specifically states that users consent to be bound . . . 
by . . . using the website”); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 
(E.D. Cal. 2000) (refusing to dismiss breach of contract claim involving “browse 
wrap license” and noting that although “the user is not immediately confronted 
with the notice of the license agreement, this does not dispose of [plaintiff’s] 
breach of contract claim”). 
 70. E.g., Specht, 306 F.3d at 19–30. 
 71. See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, 
Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to 
the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 20 (2011) (surveying eight popular 
service providers’ methods for acquiring consent to terms of service and finding 
that all of them provided links to the terms rather than displaying them 
directly). 
 72. E.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839–40 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (enforcing a contract found one click away); Kwan v. Clearwire Corp., No. 
C09-1392JLR, slip op. at 10–11 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012) (finding no assent 
when a consumer had to click on three links to locate a contract). 
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addition, it had to be obvious which boilerplate applied; if a link 
led to a menu of undifferentiated contracts, and the consumer 
could not easily identify the correct one, then I would not count 
any of them. 
Figure 2 
 
These two criteria also guided the inclusion of terms that 
were incorporated by reference in qualifying boilerplate (a 
common occurrence in the online world). First, acceptance: the 
actual text of the originating contract had to include a reference 
to the incorporated terms, such that acceptance of the former 
implied acceptance of the latter. Second, availability: the 
incorporated terms had to be easily accessible to the reader of the 
originating contract. For example, the text of Dell’s Terms and 
Conditions of Sale contained a hyperlink to a Return Policy (in 
such a manner that it was clear that acceptance of the one 
constituted acceptance of the other), and the hyperlink led 
directly to the Return Policy terms. In contrast, a later “Service 
Contracts” hyperlink within the Terms and Conditions of Sale 
failed to satisfy the availability criterion; it took two mouse clicks 
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just to get to a menu of potentially applicable contracts, and it 
was not entirely clear which of them applied. Therefore, the 
Return Policy was included in the overall volume measurement 
but the Service Contracts were not. 
2. Assumptions About the Scope of the Transaction 
The second judgment call inherent in my analysis involved 
which software boilerplate to include. As we all know, when you 
start up a computer for the first time, you find all sorts of 
programs that you may not have known were part of your 
purchase—games, trial versions of software, system accessories, 
and so forth. Opening such programs often leads to click-wrap 
boilerplate. Should such contracts be counted in the study? 
As before, my approach here was conservative; I only 
included contracts associated with programs and features that 
the seller had represented as part of the deal when I ordered the 
computer. A reasonable purchaser might expect more programs 
than that as a practical matter because extras like media players 
and DVD burners come standard on most computers. But a 
conservative approach to contract law would tell us that the 
purchaser only has a right to expect those programs that were 
explicitly promised. 
Again, I did not pay extra for any of this software; all of it 
came with the computer. And of course the same enforceability 
criteria applied here; none of the software contracts counted 
unless I clearly and affirmatively manifested assent and could 
easily access their terms. 
In the aggregate, what these conservative assumptions mean 
is that the study almost certainly underestimates information 
costs that boilerplate truly imposed in the transaction, perhaps 
by a wide margin.73 The acceptance criterion means that the word 
                                                                                                     
 73. To take just one example, my conservative criteria ended up excluding 
a lot of arbitration procedures, despite the fact that a court would almost 
certainly find that the presence of arbitration clauses binds the consumer to use 
those procedures. In most cases, however, those procedures were excluded 
because they failed to satisfy the availability criterion: the arbitration clauses 
usually linked to the home page of an arbitration organization (e.g., the 
American Arbitration Association or JAMS), rather than to the particular 
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count includes only those contracts that very clearly alerted the 
consumer to the need to search for terms because it was very 
clear that proceeding with the transaction meant agreeing to be 
bound. And more important, the availability criterion means that 
only those contracts that could be easily located would qualify—
even though in reality courts might enforce contracts that are 
much harder to find. In several important respects, then, the 
study makes information costs look less costly than they really 
are. 
C. Study Results 
Even under the conservative assumptions outlined above, the 
four purchases produced a weighted average of twenty-five 
binding contracts totaling 74,897 words.74 In other words, the 
average computer purchase binds the consumer to twenty-five 
contracts, comprising 74,897 words of boilerplate. To put that 
word count in perspective, it’s just a tad less than the number of 
words in the first Harry Potter book.75 Of course, Harry Potter is a 
                                                                                                     
arbitration procedures to which the consumer would be bound—and it took 
several clicks of the mouse and some guesswork to find those procedures on the 
organization’s website. Nevertheless, a court would almost certainly say that 
the consumer had a contractual obligation to arbitrate and to use those 
procedures. (For instance, the arbitration clause that was upheld in Cavalier 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003), merely stated that 
disputes would be arbitrated under American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
procedures, with no hyperlink to the AAA website, let alone to the procedures 
themselves. Brief of Appellant Cavalier Manufacturing, Inc. at 5, Cavalier Mfg. 
v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003).). 
 74. The exact figures were 24.75 contracts and 74,897.19 words. A 
weighted average was used so that data from sellers with a greater market 
share would receive proportionately more emphasis in the calculation, under the 
theory that consumers are more likely to buy products from them than from 
their competitors. The weights used correspond to the market share figures from 
supra note 63. (The non-weighted average would not have been much different: 
twenty-three contracts comprising 71,828 words.) See the Appendices for a full 
breakdown of the figures discussed in this section. 
 75. Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone totaled 76,944 words, according to 
the never-wrong Internet. See Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone, THE 
HARRY POTTER LEXICON, http://www.hp-lexicon.org/about/books/ps/book_ps.html 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (citing the book’s publisher for a word count) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Granted, the Harry Potter books got 
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page-turner, whereas boilerplate contracts are anything but. So 
perhaps a better analogy is tax forms: you could read every word 
of the instruction booklet for IRS Form 1040a, cover to cover—all 
eighty-eight pages—and still be more than a thousand words 
short of the boilerplate total from this single computer 
purchase.76 Or, for the truly masochistic among you, try reading 
this Article, and then do it again, and then once more. And don’t 
skip the footnotes this time. 
  
                                                                                                     
much longer; J.K. Rowling really started to get verbose with the 107,253 words 
of book three. See Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban, THE HARRY POTTER 
LEXICON, http://www.hp-lexicon.org/about/books/pa/book_pa.html (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2013) (citing the book’s publisher for a word count) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). One suspects that the success of the series 
had put Rowling beyond the influence of any editor by this point; the fourth 
book was even longer, and the fifth book set the record for the series, clocking in 
at 257,045 words! See Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix, THE HARRY 
POTTER LEXICON, http://www.hp-lexicon.org/about/books/op/book_op.html (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2013) (citing the book’s publisher for a word count) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 76. Cutting and pasting the text of the 2011 1040a instructions from the 
PDF (at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040a.pdf) into Microsoft Word resulted 
in a word count of 73,509. IRS, I.R.S. 1040A Instructions 2011 (Nov. 25, 2011), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040a.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Table 1: Summary of Results
  
 




Contracts . . . overall 
. . . at 
purchase 
. . . at 
computer 
startup 
. . . at 
program 
startup . . . per $ 
Acer 12 33,128 9,135 23,993 0 47.1 
Dell 29 78,203 9,765 24,165 44,273 84.7 
HP 25 79,340 0 24,328 55,012 103.4 
Toshiba 27 96,641 18,678 34,744 43,219 131.5 
Total 93 287,312 37,578 107,230 142,504  
Total 








Average 23.25 71,828 9,394 26,807 35,626 91.7 
Weighted 








1. Information Acquisition Costs 
The number of words is informative, and we will return to 
the question of total volume when we consider information 
processing costs (the “how much” question). First, however, what 
does the study tell us about the cost of information acquisition? 
Even with the conservative assumptions discussed above, one 
acquisition issue comes through loud and clear—an issue one can 
appreciate only through a vertical study: the “when” question. At 
what stage of the transaction was each contract encountered? 
Of the 74,897 total words, only 7,699 (10.3%) were presented 
to me by the time I had to decide whether to order (and pay for) 
the computer.77 I had to wait until the computer arrived before 
the rest were made available. Of the remaining 67,198 words, 
25,912 (34.6%) were presented when the computer arrived and 
                                                                                                     
 77. Note that if I had bought the computer in a store instead of online, 
many of the website’s boilerplate terms would have arrived as paperwork in the 
box, or would have been presented to me on startup. Whether those 
presentations would have satisfied my enforceability criteria is an issue I did 
not explore. 
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was first started up, and the other 41,287 (55.1%) when 
individual programs were opened.78 
In other words, the verticality of the study shows how very 
pertinent the issue of late-arriving terms is. At the time that 
consumers tender payment, they will have had no opportunity to 
express their preferences regarding nine out of every ten words to 
which they will become contractually bound. Of course, they will 
eventually have the opportunity to explicitly say no to these late-
arriving terms, and thus to communicate their preferences to the 
market.79 But that opportunity arises only after a considerable 
investment in acquiring the information that would bear on 
formation of those preferences—the time spent navigating the 
website, deciding which computer to buy, placing the order, 
waiting for the shipment, starting up the computer, and opening 
the various programs to find the applicable contractual language. 
That investment represents a considerable information 
acquisition cost. In essence, by the time I have an opportunity to 
express my preferences to the market, I am no longer at the 
market. I am already home. 
Moreover, the true acquisition cost imposed by late-arriving 
terms would actually be a multiple of the cost I experienced in my 
study because, for a market to function most effectively, 
consumer decisionmaking should be not only compensatory but 
                                                                                                     
 78. I might have been able to find some of the late-arriving boilerplate by 
searching the websites of the software providers before deciding to purchase. 
But such an approach would have carried acquisition costs of its own, and it is 
far from certain that I could have located the correct terms. See Jean Braucher, 
Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive 
Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1860–61 (2000) [hereinafter Braucher, Delayed 
Disclosure] (finding that 87.5% of software websites did not make boilerplate 
available to consumers pre-purchase); James F. Rodriguez, Software End User 
Licensing Agreements: A Survey of Industry Practices in the Summer of 2003, 
at 2 (unpublished and undated manuscript) (finding that only twelve of forty-
three major software companies provided license terms on their websites, none 
provided an easily identifiable pre-purchase link to the terms, and only two 
offered a website search capability enabling users to find the terms) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. This opportunity to explicitly manifest or refuse express assent is what 
makes the boilerplate term enforceable, even under the most consumer-friendly 
cases, such as Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339–41 (D. Kan. 
2000) (noting that late-arriving terms are enforceable if consumers “expressly 
agree[] to them”). 
194 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (2013) 
comparative. Consumers do not decide whether they will 
purchase a given product in the abstract; they decide whether to 
purchase it in light of the options available from other sellers. 
This means that for a consumer to truly express his or her 
market preferences regarding late-arriving boilerplate, he or she 
would have to order multiple computers, start them all up, open 
the programs on each, and then examine the boilerplate within. 
To make such a comparison between the four computers in this 
study would have meant reading fifty-six unique contracts 
totaling 161,767 words.80 
Finally, having made that comparison and decided which 
terms to reject, the consumer would have to register that 
rejection with the marketplace—e.g., by returning the rejected 
feature and receiving a corresponding refund. Even if we 
generously assume that the seller’s return policy allows for this 
possibility, it is far from clear how it would work in practice. How 
could one return, say, the antivirus software but retain the 
operating system (and what would the refund be)? If the return 
really turns out to be an all-or-nothing proposition, then it sends 
a weak signal to the marketplace because it would not be clear 
which features prompted the rejection. And even if these 
obstacles could be overcome, the return process adds more 
expense (including both the hassle and the possibility of 
restocking fees), which means more information acquisition costs. 
                                                                                                     
 80. When all the boilerplate in the four transactions is added together, 
there were ninety-three contracts totaling 287,312 words. Appendix A. But there 
was some overlap among these contracts (for example, each seller offered the 
same Microsoft Windows license), so the number of unique contracts was lower. 
This demonstrates the intuitive notion that comparison among products is 
easier if each seller offers the exact same features—but that is hardly an 
argument for market function; it simply substitutes an antitrust problem for an 
information cost problem. Note also that more of the unique contracts arrived 
early in the transaction, such that a consumer who bought all four computers 
for comparison purposes would have encountered nearly one out of every four 
unique terms (24.1%) before submitting payment, rather than one out of every 
ten (10.3%). 
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2. Information Processing Costs 
The analysis so far has shown that the costs of acquiring 
information about boilerplate are a significant impediment to 
compensatory decisionmaking. As we have already seen, however, 
the cost of processing information can constitute a separate and 
equally problematic obstacle to market function. So what does the 
case study have to teach us about the information processing 
costs associated with boilerplate? 
The issue here is one of sheer volume of terms—the “how 
much” question. A few empiricists have taken note, mostly in 
passing, of the volume of boilerplate terms that sellers present to 
consumers. For example, one of Marotta-Wurgler’s horizontal 
studies found an average length of 1,500 words for the typical 
end-user license agreement in the software industry.81 And a 
horizontal study of the boilerplate that accompanied the top fifty 
programs at Download.com for 2006 found an average of 2,752 
words and a nearly-college-level readability.82 
Here again, we see the advantages of a study that looks 
vertically at all the boilerplate in a single transaction. As noted 
above, even under my conservative assumptions, the average 
computer purchase results in 74,897 words of binding contracts. 
This finding casts the information overload problem in sharp 
relief. Even if all that boilerplate were presented up front—i.e., 
even if the acquisition problem were solved—consumers could not 
engage in compensatory decisionmaking unless they first paid the 
processing cost of reading and understanding the terms well 
enough to form preferences and compare them to other sellers’ 
contractual offerings. 
Whether consumers would pay that cost depends on how 
high it is. Recall that consumers who confront complex products 
(like computers) minimize those costs by satisficing—ignoring 
certain features in favor of others. The higher the cost of 
processing boilerplate, then, the more likely consumers are to 
                                                                                                     
 81. Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6, at 694. 
 82. Jens Grossklags & Nathan Good, Empirical Studies on Software 
Notices to Inform Policy Makers and Usability Designers, in FINANCIAL 
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 341, 346–47 (Sven Dietrich & Rachna 
Dhamija eds., 2007). 
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ignore it and turn their attention instead to other, more salient 
product features.83 
The question, then, is how to measure the cost of processing 
74,897 words of boilerplate. One potential answer is to measure 
the time one would need to read all those terms. A few studies 
have examined how long it takes the average person to read legal 
text. The most relevant, conducted by Michael Masson and Mary 
Anne Waldron, presented subjects with short excerpts from four 
contracts (a mortgage, a property sale, a bank loan, and a lease 
renewal) and measured how long it took to read and understand 
them.84 That study’s application here is somewhat complicated by 
the fact that it also explored the effect of using “plain English” in 
contracts, so it tested four different versions of each contract 
(with varying degrees of complexity in wording) and thus did not 
produce a single average reading rate.85 Furthermore, because it 
involved short excerpts of a few hundred words each rather than 
long contracts,86 its results might not be a precise fit for the 
contracts at issue here, which averaged 3,016 words; perhaps 
reading speed increases as one goes along, or declines as one gets 
tired. Nevertheless, by averaging the reading rates for the 
various contracts in the study, we can reach a fair estimate of 
how fast the typical consumer can read contractual language: 
177.5 words per minute.87 
At that rate, the 74,897 words worth of boilerplate would 
take just over seven hours to read (assuming, optimistically, that 
                                                                                                     
 83. Supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 84. See generally Michael E.J. Masson & Mary Anne Waldron, 
Comprehension of Legal Contracts by Non-Experts: Effectiveness of Plain 
Language Redrafting, 8 APPLIED COG. PSYCHOL. 67 (1994). 
 85. Id. at 74–75. There is no easy way to determine which of the 
experiment’s different wording categories the contracts at issue here would fall 
under. Note that one study of complexity in consumer contracts suggests that 
shorter contracts are easier to comprehend, although that result is confounded 
somewhat by the fact that the shorter contract was also written in simpler 
language. See Davis, supra note 37, at 869. 
 86. Masson & Waldron, supra note 84, at 71. 
 87. I arrived at this figure by taking the study’s four entire-document 
reading rates and averaging them. Id. at 74 tbl.4. One might object to using an 
average, rather than one of the specific rates that Masson and Waldron found, 
but it would make little difference; the four rates only ranged from a low of 
167.0 to a high of 193.6. Id. 
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the reader could keep up the pace for that long without a moment’s 
rest).88 Therefore, even if all the contracts had been presented to 
the reader at the outset of the transaction, such that information 
acquisition costs were low, the information processing costs of 
actually reading the contracts would be significant—further 
evidence that consumers would focus instead on other product 
features and thus fail to register their preferences regarding 
boilerplate terms. And, as with acquisition costs, consumers who 
wish to make an apples-to-apples comparison would also have to 
read the contracts that competing vendors offered; to do so with 
the four competing products at issue here would have meant more 
than fifteen hours of reading.89 
Yet even this conclusion may underestimate the amount of 
information overload because, when it comes to boilerplate, 
compensatory decisionmaking requires not only reading but 
understanding.90 Masson and Waldron used two mechanisms 
(question-answering and paraphrasing) to measure how well 
their subjects understood the contracts at the above reading 
speed—and found them wanting.91 Comprehension improved 
when archaic terms were replaced, yet even then “performance of 
subjects on both the question-answering and the paraphrase 
tasks remained relatively poor (in the best cases average 
performance ranged from about one-third to two-thirds correct, 
depending on which aspect of comprehension was measured) and 
misconceptions were apparent across all versions of the 
documents.”92 In other words, even at the relatively slow reading 
rate of 177.5 words per minute, a substantial subset of consumers 
                                                                                                     
 88. 74,897 words ÷ 177.5 words/minute = 421.95 minutes, or 7.03 hours. 
 89. As explained supra note 80, there was some overlap among the 
boilerplate that each seller offered, so consumers who had already read one 
seller’s boilerplate would be able to save some time when they got to the next 
seller. 
 90. Note also that part of the problem with boilerplate is that consumers 
can’t know what it covers without at least skimming it. In a sense, then, 
consumers don’t know whether they should read boilerplate until after they 
have done so! At a minimum, it takes some effort even to determine whether 
learning the contents of boilerplate can be discounted in favor of learning about 
other product features. 
 91. Masson & Waldron, supra note 84, at 72. 
 92. Id. at 79. 
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would have a hard time understanding boilerplate and 
consequently would have a hard time forming and expressing 
compensatory and comparative preferences regarding contractual 
terms.93 
Another way to get a sense of information processing costs is 
to express them in dollars per word. After all, computers are 
expensive—the four in the study averaged $782.24—and one 
might tolerate higher information costs when spending a lot of 
money, so as to ensure that a big expenditure produces a 
worthwhile payoff. Even under this metric, however, the 
information costs are significant. The 74,897 words of boilerplate 
worked out to a weighted average of ninety-three words per dollar 
spent. For comparison’s sake, imagine having to read ninety-
three words of boilerplate each time you buy a can of soda, or 279 
words when buying a three-dollar gallon of milk, or 5,580 words 
when filling a twenty-gallon tank with gas. And none of the 
contracts here seemed to be related to my choice to buy 
moderately powerful computers, so more affordable models would 
likely have come with exactly the same contracts. 
In the end, however one chooses to measure information 
costs, the evidence strongly suggests that the market would not 
be responsive to consumer preferences regarding the binding 
boilerplate in this study. Consumers confronted with such 
purchases would almost certainly ignore the boilerplate entirely; 
the costs of finding and reading it are quite high, and they would 
likely consider its terms to be less important than other, more 
salient features of the transaction. (As a general matter, 
boilerplate terms relate to rare events—the defective product, the 
lost shipment, the litigious purchaser—for which the average 
consumer has little legal exposure.94) 
Boilerplate would accordingly be one of those product 
features that would not make the cut when consumers, 
overloaded by information, abandon compensatory 
decisionmaking in favor of satisficing. And when consumers 
                                                                                                     
 93. For a discussion of how a representative subset of informed consumers 
might avert market failure, see infra Part IV.A. 
 94. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 663; Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 243; 
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 443; Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1226. 
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ignore contract terms, the market ignores contract terms—
removing the justification for enforcement of those terms in the 
first place. 
IV. Responding to Boilerplate’s Defenders 
In Part II, we saw that in transactions of even moderate 
complexity, consumers satisfice; they abandon compensatory 
decisionmaking and focus their limited attention on a few product 
features. Horizontal studies of consumer decisionmaking have 
begun to provide evidence that such satisficing threatens the 
function of the boilerplate market. In Part III, I presented new, 
vertical evidence of this dysfunction, showing that both 
acquisition costs and processing costs are even higher than the 
horizontal studies have shown. All in all, then, the evidence 
suggests that boilerplate is high on the list of features that 
consumers ignore. 
If the enforceability of boilerplate terms depends on their 
responsiveness to consumer preferences, it seems impossible to 
defend enforcement when most consumers ignore those terms. 
Yet scholars have offered two distinct arguments in favor of 
enforcing boilerplate even in the face of the mounting evidence 
that it goes unread. The first is an ex ante argument that the 
market works, due to a sufficiently large subset of consumers 
that actually do read the terms. The second is an ex post 
argument that even when the market fails, reputational concerns 
keep sellers from unduly aggressive enforcement of one-sided 
terms. 
If either of these arguments is correct, then this Article has 
not proved anything, and no regulatory intrusion into the market 
is necessary notwithstanding boilerplate’s information cost 
problem. In the following discussion, however, I evaluate both 
arguments, on their own merits and in light of the verticality 
findings above, and find them wanting. 
A. Informed-Minority Theory 
No market functions perfectly. Information costs and other 
impediments to compensatory decisionmaking are the rule, not 
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the exception, even for transactions that involve no contractual 
terms whatsoever.95 Therefore, although there is compelling 
evidence that when it comes to boilerplate the market does not 
function particularly well, the question is whether it functions 
well enough. 
The answer to this question depends partly on the available 
alternatives to pure market regulation (“well enough” in 
comparison to what?), an issue to which we will return in Part V. 
But the answer also depends on how dysfunctional the market is. 
In a perfectly functioning market, every consumer would 
costlessly find, read, and understand all adhesive contract terms 
and would then use compensatory decisionmaking to weigh their 
impact in the purchase decision. As Alan Schwartz and Louis 
Wilde have argued, however, a less-than-perfect market, in which 
only some consumers pay attention to those terms, can produce 
approximately the same outcome as a fully functional market, so 
long as sellers compete for those marginal, attentive consumers.96 
In other words, if information costs cause most but not all 
consumers to ignore boilerplate, the consumers who do pay 
attention—the “informed minority”—might represent the 
interests of the ignorant, such that the resulting terms would 
adequately reflect overall consumer preferences.97 
Numerous commentators have relied on the Schwartz and 
Wilde theory to argue that the market adequately responds to 
consumer preferences even when many consumers are ignorant 
                                                                                                     
 95. See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer 
Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 512 (1981) (“[V]irtually no consumer product 
market or associated information market meets the textbook ideal of perfect 
information and perfect competition.”); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 630 
(“It is generally recognized . . . that information is never perfect; the 
decisionmaker’s task, therefore, is to characterize, in terms of the need for 
intervention, real world states that are intermediate between perfect 
information and perfect ignorance.”). 
 96. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 638 (“Rather than asking whether 
an idealized individual is sufficiently informed to maximize his own utility, the 
appropriate normative inquiry is whether competition among firms for 
particular groups of searchers is, in any given market, sufficient to generate 
optimal prices and terms for all consumers.”); see also id. at 659–62 (offering 
some observations about the implications of this theory for boilerplate). 
 97. Id. at 660. 
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about its offerings.98 In the boilerplate context, however, this 
argument depends on a number of questionable premises. First, it 
assumes that the consumers who constitute the informed 
minority have the same preferences (with regard to contractual 
terms) as the ignorant majority.99 Yet we already know that the 
members of the informed minority are different in at least one 
important way: they read the boilerplate that the rest of us 
ignore. Why would we think that they would be different in only 
that one respect?100 By definition their payoff from reading a 
contract is higher than most people’s, which suggests a different 
valuation for the terms it contains.101 In short, for the informed-
minority theory to work, we must assume heterogeneity in the 
                                                                                                     
 98. E.g., Baird, supra note 10, at 936 (“The sophisticated buyer provides 
protection for those that are entirely ignorant.”); Clayton Gillette, Pre-Approved 
Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2005) (noting 
that the inability of a seller to distinguish attentive consumers from inattentive 
consumers will prevent the seller from acting opportunistically); George L. 
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1347 
(1981) (“If a small group of consumers reads warranties and selects among 
products according to warranty context, manufacturers may be forced to draft 
warranties responsive to the group’s preferences, even though the large majority 
of consumers generally neglect warranty terms.”). 
 99. If they don’t, they cannot represent the majority; they would send 
sellers the wrong market signal. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 638 
(“When the preferences of searchers are positively correlated with the 
preferences of nonsearchers, competition among firms for searchers should tend 
to protect all consumers.”). 
 100. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 671 (“All that we can know [about 
members of the informed minority] is that they are particularly sensitive to 
some aspect of the contract—not that the average consumer (or even just one 
other consumer outside the marginal minority) necessarily shares their 
preferences.”); id. at 676 (“[T]here is no guarantee—indeed it seems unlikely—
that the marginal consumer will be typical of other consumers.”). 
 101. Another possibility is that the informed minority comprises repeat 
purchasers, who choose to incur the information costs because they can amortize 
them across a number of purchases. Such purchasers might have idiosyncratic 
preferences regarding the content of terms; for example, they would not care as 
much about a class action waiver because their high volume would make it cost-
efficient to sue individually. See Gillette, supra note 7, at 694. But even if their 
preferences were the same as the ignorant majority’s, repeat buyers are more 
likely to be accommodated when something goes wrong (even if the contract 
does not require such accommodation)—which means that they will be less 
worried about contractual guarantees and therefore less able to act as a proxy 
for nonreaders. Id. at 692. And of course, the amortization argument assumes 
that the boilerplate does not change over time; try telling that to an iTunes user. 
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minority’s proclivity to read boilerplate but homogeneity in its 
preferences for boilerplate terms—a dubious pair of assumptions 
and a slim reed on which to build a theory of enforcement. 
Second, even if the informed minority has the same 
boilerplate preferences as the ignorant majority, the former 
cannot adequately represent the latter if sellers can differentiate 
between the two groups.102 Sellers that can differentiate will offer 
better terms to the informed minority and continue to offer one-
sided terms to the uninformed majority, thereby delinking the 
fates of the two groups and returning the latter market to a 
largely nonresponsive state.103 How easy such differentiation 
would be is an open question, dependent on the particular 
industry at issue.104 In the online context, for example, one could 
easily imagine a website offering different terms to different 
consumers based on their browsing habits and the attention they 
pay to boilerplate.105 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 638 (assuming that “it is 
usually too expensive for firms to distinguish among extensive, moderate, and 
nonsearchers” and that “it would often be too expensive to draft different 
contracts for each of these groups even if they could conveniently be identified”); 
id. at 663–64 (explicitly addressing this assumption). 
 103. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 656; Gillette, supra note 7, at 692; 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 228 (2006). Omri Ben-Shahar provides an interesting 
example of how this differentiation can be done in the very body of the contract: 
a clause in a residential Comcast contract offered an arbitration opt-out—which 
would of course be seen only by the attentive (read: rare) reader. Omri Ben-
Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity To Read” in Contract Law, 6 EUR. REV. 
CONT. L. 1, 20 (2009) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar, Opportunity To Read]. 
 104. On a related note, Ted Cruz and Jeffrey Hinck see an inherent tension 
between, on the one hand, the number of informed consumers and, on the other, 
the ability of sellers to differentiate. The informed-minority theory grows more 
plausible as the number of attentive readers necessary to adequately represent 
the ignorant majority decreases—but Cruz and Hinck argue that “[t]he ability to 
identify and segregate consumers . . . becomes much easier as the number of 
informed buyers becomes smaller” and therefore “[u]nder such conditions, the 
seller needs only to target a small proportion of his buyers to defeat the effect of 
an informed minority upon the terms offered to uninformed consumers.” Cruz & 
Hinck, supra note 15, at 656. 
 105. See Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers 
in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 17 (2009) (exploring the possibility 
that industries can “employ new e-technologies to segregate readers and offer 
them more advantageous terms”); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 471–
72 (“E-businesses can use data on consumer behavior collected from their prior 
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Finally, the market is likely to underproduce informed 
consumers because the informed-minority theory creates a 
collective action problem: only a few consumers incur the 
information costs, but all consumers reap the resulting benefits. 
This means that even consumers who are inclined to read the 
boilerplate have an incentive to ignore it, sit back, and free-ride 
on the efforts of others.106 In contrast, the seller always pays 
careful attention to boilerplate terms because the seller is a party 
to every transaction to which the terms apply and thus 
internalizes all their benefits.107 (Indeed, the seller is the party 
that drafted the terms.) 
These arguments give us reason to doubt the informed-
minority theory, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating: are 
boilerplate-reading consumers really common enough to 
adequately represent the interests of their nonreading 
counterparts? Schwartz and Wilde themselves are skeptical, 
estimating that more than one in three consumers would have to 
read the boilerplate for the informed-minority concept to work.108 
Modeling and industry-specific empirics suggest that their 
skepticism is well-founded.109 For example, one study of software 
                                                                                                     
transactions and offer different terms to those consumers who are most likely to 
read the boilerplate (or who have already read it during a prior site visit).”); cf. 
Ben-Shahar, Opportunity To Read, supra note 103, at 20 (noting that contracts 
can easily distinguish between readers and non-readers by offering an 
opportunity to opt out of a clearly pro-seller term). 
 106. See Beales et al., supra note 95, at 503; Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 
668; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 447. 
 107. This is merely another way of stating the information asymmetry 
problem familiar to those who study adhesion contracts. See, e.g., POSNER, supra 
note 8, at 145; Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869, 
901 (2011); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 243. 
 108. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 661. 
 109. For modeling, see Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 648–55 (concluding 
that under reasonable assumptions “the proportion of consumers that must be 
term-informed is somewhere between 10% and 30%, both of which are relatively 
large given the impediments to formation of an informed minority”). For 
empirics, see Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a 
Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 3 (NYU Law & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 195, 2009) (finding an “informed minority . . . orders of 
magnitude smaller than the required informed minority size in the theoretical 
examples of Schwartz and Wilde”), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/ 
195. 
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retailers who made their licensing agreements available online 
found that only two out of every one thousand shoppers accessed 
the agreements for more than one second—and even that small 
subset averaged less than a minute spent on the relevant web 
page.110 
Yet even these caveats do not fully capture the limitations of 
the informed-minority theory because they consider boilerplate in 
the abstract rather than as part of a complex, integrated 
transaction. In other words, for a real-world perspective, we must 
examine the impact of verticality on the informed-minority 
theory. And as it turns out, verticality challenges the informed-
minority theory in two particular ways. 
First, this Article’s vertical study reveals information costs 
that are much higher than previous studies have shown; the 
informed minority acquires almost all of the boilerplate late in 
the transaction and faces more than seven hours of reading.111 As 
these information costs increase, the number of contract readers 
will shrink, all else being equal. After all, even those with an 
idiosyncratic tendency to read boilerplate must deal with their 
own finite resources and cognitive limitations. And as the number 
of readers shrinks, so does the likelihood that the informed 
minority will be of sufficient size to serve as an adequate proxy. 
Second, the added complexity of a fully vertical transaction 
may increase the differences between the preferences of the 
informed minority and the preferences of the ignorant majority, 
such that the former cannot represent the latter in the 
marketplace. Homogeneity of demand with regard to a single 
product is one thing; homogeneity of demand with regard to an 
entire series of products is another.112 As discussed above, in a 
vertical-boilerplate situation it can be prohibitively hard for the 
consumer to reject a single contract or term; one usually either 
                                                                                                     
 110. Bakos et al., supra note 109, at 3, 26. 
 111. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 112. It is possible, however, that increased complexity brings with it 
increased, rather than decreased, homogeneity—i.e., that heterogeneity in 
individual demand is smoothed out by bundling more products into the 
transaction. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text (discussing 
bundling). If this is true, then added complexity would not make the informed 
minority less able to represent the ignorant majority. 
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rejects or accepts the entire transaction.113 Therefore, as more 
sellers and features are introduced—i.e., as vertical complexity 
increases—the ability to send a signal to the market about a 
single product feature (such as a boilerplate term) becomes 
increasingly muted. 
In the end, then, the informed-minority theory gives us little 
reason to be confident in the market’s responsiveness to 
consumers’ boilerplate preferences. In theory, a subset of 
attentive consumers could serve as a proxy for the inattentive 
remainder. But in practice, the empirical evidence points the 
other way, and the assumptions on which the informed-minority 
argument rests prove far-fetched—even more so once it is applied 
to a real-world vertical transaction that involves multiple 
adhesion contracts and other indicators of high product 
complexity. 
B. Reputational Theory 
Commentators have also offered a second, separate defense 
of boilerplate’s enforceability in the face of seemingly insuperable 
information costs: the reputational theory. The gist of the 
reputational theory is that it does not matter if boilerplate terms 
fail to respond to consumer preferences at the time of contract 
formation because, when the opportunity arises to enforce a term 
at the tail end of the transaction, sellers waive enforcement and 
accommodate the consumer.114 
And why would the seller do so? For reputational reasons. It 
wants to retain the consumer’s future business and avoid 
becoming known for poor customer service.115 Thus boilerplate is 
                                                                                                     
 113. Supra Part III.C.1. 
 114. E.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 145; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. 
Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 827, 829–31 (2006); Gillette, supra note 7, at 703–12; Robert A. Hillman, 
Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 747 (2002); Hillman & Rachlinski, 
supra note 8, at 442; Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic 
Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation 
Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 879 (2006); Rakoff, 
supra note 1, at 1221. 
 115. See sources cited supra note 114. 
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not a concern (the argument goes), because even if the market 
fails to rid the transaction of unwanted terms ex ante, 
reputational concerns will get rid of them ex post.116 
If reputational constraints are sufficient to govern the 
outcome of disputes, however, why do we need boilerplate at 
all?117 The answer that the theory’s proponents give is that a 
seller will not always disregard contractual clauses in favor of a 
customer service strategy.118 Instead, the seller will enforce 
boilerplate selectively, reserving its use for those few 
opportunistic consumers who seek to exploit the seller’s “the 
customer is always right” instinct—e.g., the conniving buyer who 
damages a product and then tries to return it as defective.119 The 
boilerplate terms are thus relevant because they form an ex ante 
                                                                                                     
 116. See sources cited supra note 114. 
 117. See Hillman & Barakat, supra note 105, at 12 (“If accepted, the 
[reputational] argument means that we do not need contract law at all.”). 
Indeed, one well-known study of actual business-to-business practices found 
that reputation dominates contracts as the key determinant in dispute 
resolution.  
Even where the parties have a detailed and carefully planned 
agreement which indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller fails to 
deliver on time, often they will never refer to the agreement but will 
negotiate a solution when the problem arises apparently as if there 
had never been any original contract. 
Stewart Macaulay, Noncontractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Noncontractual 
Relations]. 
 118. See sources cited supra note 114. 
 119. Clay Gillette uses a similar example in Rolling Contracts as an Agency 
Problem, supra note 7, at 704; see also Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 114, at 
834 (using an example of a hotel guest who checks out late). Some of the theory’s 
proponents further explain that, although boilerplate gives sellers an advantage 
over consumers, that advantage merely counterbalances an advantage that 
consumers have: namely, sellers have a reputation in the marketplace that tells 
consumers which sellers to avoid, but consumers have no reputation that tells 
sellers which consumers to avoid. Thus there is a need for an ex post contractual 
mechanism to weed out the “bad” consumers. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 
114, at 829–30; Gillette, supra note 7, at 704. But see eBay, All About Feedback 
Policies, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/feedback-ov.html (last visited Feb. 4, 
2013) (describing a feedback system that not only allows eBay buyers to rate 
sellers but also allows sellers to rate buyers) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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baseline from which the seller has the ex post discretion to 
depart.120 
Unlike the informed-minority theory, the reputational theory 
neatly solves the problem of information costs, in both their 
horizontal and vertical dimensions, because under its approach 
boilerplate terms are only enforced against the rare opportunist 
who deserves no better. My vertical empirics thus do not directly 
speak to the reputational theory. (Indeed, if the theory is true, 
there is no boilerplate problem to be solved.) Nevertheless, the 
theory fails to survive when evaluated in light of my broader 
theme: examining the boilerplate problem from the perspective of 
what actually takes place in the real world. When one views the 
reputational defense from that perspective, its foundations fall 
away; it is revealed to be merely an interesting theory, rather 
than a practical justification for enforcing real-world boilerplate 
against real-world consumers. 
The reputational theory proves unrealistic for three reasons. 
First, the theory relies on questionable assumptions about sellers’ 
ability to differentiate among consumers. For the reputational 
dynamic to rescue boilerplate, we must expect a seller to be 
unable to distinguish opportunistic buyers ex ante but somehow 
be able to distinguish them ex post (because a seller that can 
make the distinction ex ante will simply impose different 
boilerplate terms on the different types of buyers).121 Both 
propositions are problematic. How certain are we that sellers can 
accurately identify the consumers who really received defective 
products and distinguish them from the opportunists? And how 
certain are we that sellers could draw such distinctions at the tail 
                                                                                                     
 120. POSNER, supra note 8, at 145 (“[T]he seller’s right to stand on the 
contract as written will protect it against opportunistic buyers.”); Johnston, 
supra note 114, at 878 (“The key to understanding why a firm can benefit by 
allowing its employees to forgive some customers’ contract breaches lies in the 
recognition that not all existing customers are worth keeping.”); Rakoff, supra 
note 1, at 1221 (“[I]f legal liabilities are set lower than the obligations that the 
firm recognizes in its actual practice, the gap can provide room to maneuver in 
the face of inevitable adversity.”). 
 121. See Johnston, supra note 114, at 879 (describing sellers’ ex post 
enforcement discretion as “a substitute for ex-ante screening”). 
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end of the transaction but not at the front end?122 It seems just as 
likely, if not more so, that the presence of one-sided boilerplate 
would scare off the “good” customers from even asking for 
accommodation.123 Indeed, one reasonable definition of an 
opportunistic customer would be someone who hounds sellers for 
concessions to which he or she is not legally entitled—which 
would imply no accommodation for anyone who bothers to ask.124 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1235, 1236 (2006) [hereinafter Rakoff, Sociology of Boilerplate] (stating 
that the reputational dynamic will not “lead firms to recognize voluntarily the 
supposed legitimate claims of decent consumers” at a volume “congruent 
with . . . any known economic measure of an incentive for efficient behavior”); cf. 
Bob Sullivan, Discount Cellphone Sites Come with Double Dose of Termination 
Fees, Hassles, REDTAPE CHRONICLES (May 8, 2012, 5:11 AM), http://redtape. 
msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/08/11582479-discount-cellphone-sites-come-with-
double-dose-of-termination-fees-hassles?lite (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) 
(recounting a tale of an innocent customer who was not accommodated until the 
news bureau got involved) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 123. See Gillette, supra note 7, at 706 (“Sellers may use contract terms in an 
in terrorem effort to deter requests for redress, or as an initial response to buyer 
complaints.”); Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts 
and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory 
Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 91 (1997) 
(finding that exculpatory clauses in contracts have a deterrent effect on 
propensity to seek compensation when they are read); Charles A. Sullivan, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 
1136 (2010) (explaining that unenforceable provisions in contracts deter 
uninformed parties from exercising contractual rights). It may seem odd for 
consumers to be scared off by onerous boilerplate terms, given the compelling 
evidence that they don’t read boilerplate. But here we are not talking about 
reading boilerplate before making the purchase decision; we are talking about 
reading it much later, once something has gone wrong. Consumers who do not 
read boilerplate when entering into a transaction may well read it later when 
the transaction takes a turn for the worse and they need to assess the possibility 
of legal recourse. 
 124. In addition, some empirical research suggests that lower-class 
consumers are more likely to view contracts as binding than upper-class 
consumers. See Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship 
Among Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
381, 421–22 (2008) (presenting preliminary findings). If this is true, then the 
willingness to seek extracontractual accommodation may depend not just on 
whether a consumer is “good” or “bad” but on his or her socioeconomic status—
an unsettling possibility. 
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Second, the reputational theory resurrects the employee as 
an agent with discretion to negotiate.125 Such employee discretion 
contrasts with one of the longstanding justifications for enforcing 
boilerplate in the first place, namely the need to avoid the agency 
costs of individualized negotiation—e.g., to keep employees from 
succumbing too easily to Marshall Field’s “give the lady what she 
wants” philosophy.126 Of course, the ex post negotiation that the 
reputational theory calls for would occur less frequently, and thus 
would arguably impose lower agency costs, than the ex ante 
negotiation that would occur if all contracts were individually 
bargained. Nevertheless, for the reputational theory to work we 
must believe that the benefits of this approach would exceed the 
inevitable costs of giving employees the discretion to waive terms 
on a case-by-case basis. The theory’s proponents provide no 
evidence that this would actually be the case in the real world. 
Finally, even if we assume that employees can differentiate 
between the good and bad customers, and we zero out the agency 
costs (so that the employee invariably acts in the best interests of 
the seller), we still must believe that it is in the seller’s best 
interests to accommodate the “good” consumer.127 In other words, 
sellers may derive reputational benefit from forgoing enforcement 
of a boilerplate term, but that benefit comes at a price. For 
example, a seller incurs a cost each time it replaces a product. If 
                                                                                                     
 125. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 114, at 878–80 (highlighting the 
importance of managerial discretion to waive one-sided terms when dealing 
with “good, high value customers”). 
 126. As legend has it, Field—the founder of the eponymous Chicago 
department store—uttered this phrase as a rebuke to an employee who was 
arguing with a female customer. It soon became the store’s motto. Mark D. 
Bauer, “Give The Lady What She Wants”—As Long As It Is Macy’s, 80 TEMP. L. 
REV. 949, 950 (2007). Yet it is that very customer service attitude that 
boilerplate is meant to protect against. Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation 
and the Duty to Read—Business by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and 
Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1059 (1966) (warning against employees’ 
“the customer is always right” attitude); Macaulay, Noncontractual Relations, 
supra note 117, at 65 (citing the need to “keep . . . salesmen from making 
concessions to the customer”); Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1222–24 (warning against 
“wayward sales personnel”). Perhaps that’s why Marshall Field & Co. is no 
more. See Bauer, supra note 126, at 950 (revealing that the store is now Macy’s). 
 127. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 114, at 878–80 (discussing the benefits of 
“granting discretionary forgiveness” in loan-repayment agreements in order to 
build “profitable, long-term relationships” with “high-value” borrowers). 
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it is not contractually obligated to do so, then it will not 
accommodate a replacement request, even from a “good” 
customer, unless the reputational benefit exceeds that cost. 
That cost–benefit calculation involves a daunting number of 
unknowns. On the benefit side of the ledger, it assumes that 
consumers generate and share meaningful quantities of accurate 
reputational information.128 But like any informational asset, 
reputation is a nonrival public good; consumers therefore do not 
fully internalize the gains from publicizing their experience with 
disreputable sellers, which means that such accounts are likely to 
be underproduced.129 And even if we ignore the public-goods 
problem, sellers may find it more cost-effective to buttress their 
reputations through advertising, marketing, and outright 
manipulation than through accommodating complaining 
customers one by one.130 Indeed, short-term and one-off sellers 
                                                                                                     
 128. Although no one has conducted an empirical study of boilerplate that 
focuses on the reputational factor, Victoria Plaut and Robert Bartlett found that 
associating a click-wrap contract with Google (presumably a company with a 
good reputation) had no statistically significant effect on whether consumers 
read the contract’s terms. Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett III, Blind 
Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-
Through Agreements, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 302, 305 (2012). 
 129. See Gillette, supra note 7, at 704; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, 
at 447; cf. Rakoff, Sociology of Boilerplate, supra note 122, at 1236 (criticizing 
reputation-theory proponents for inter alia “offer[ing] no model of how the 
market in reputation works, or of why the values it generates are responsive to 
anything other than firms’ fears of how much reputational damage particular 
claimants are, for a myriad of possible reasons, in a position to cause”). Gillette 
uses the public-goods issue to show that sellers are unlikely to share 
information on disreputable consumers, but it applies equally to the sharing of 
information by consumers about sellers. See Gillette, supra note 7, at 704. 
 130. See, e.g., ReputationReset, http://www.reputationreset.com (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2013) (“We help clean up the bad [search engine] results, restoring your 
reputation and making sure poor reviews, misinformation, or bad-mouthing 
competitors no longer hold you back.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). The converse situation—websites or search engines that 
aggregate information on sellers’ boilerplate—is, like the reputational theory, an 
idea that is conceptually appealing but that has found no purchase in the real 
world. Bakos et al., supra note 109, at 33–34 (finding it “highly unlikely that 
shoppers are, to an important extent, becoming informed about EULA terms by 
consulting other online sources”); Ben-Shahar, Opportunity To Read, supra note 
103, at 22–25 (evaluating the possibility of rating services for contracts but 
finding little hope); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? 
Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software 
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probably have little interest in building a reputation through any 
means at all.131 
On the cost side of the ledger, some contractual prerogatives 
may be too valuable to give up, reputational consequences 
notwithstanding. For example, one of the most litigated issues in 
the world of boilerplate is the consumer class-action waiver.132 
Does anyone seriously believe that a seller would ever voluntarily 
forgo enforcement of such a clause? In addition, those provisions 
that are not too valuable to forgo may come up too infrequently to 
have any reputational impact one way or the other, given that 
boilerplate terms tend to govern rare contingencies.133 
For all these reasons, the reputational theory is too 
unreliable to rescue boilerplate from its shortcomings. True, it 
identifies a dynamic that might cause a seller to refrain from 
enforcing an adhesive term against a consumer. But only if the 
planets align in a particular—and particularly unrealistic—way. 
The theory falls short of providing support for the general 
proposition that allowing unread boilerplate to be enforced at the 
whim of the seller is in the public interest. 
We are therefore left with a question. If information costs 
render the market dysfunctional, and neither the informed-
minority theory nor the reputational dynamic rescues it from that 
dysfunction, what other solutions to the boilerplate problem 
exist? For the answer, we turn to Part V. 
                                                                                                     
Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 184 & n.65 (2011) (discussing the 
“EULAlyzer” boilerplate analysis program but finding it rarely used). 
 131. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 444. 
 132. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51 
(2011) (upholding consumer class-action waiver against unconscionability 
challenge). Moreover, to be truly effective, the waiver of a class-action 
prohibition would have to be done on a grand scale, rather than made on a case-
by-case basis, because by definition a class action cannot be filed by one 
consumer at a time. 
 133. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 663 (“[T]he probability of any 
single customer being affected by any given contract term is usually quite 
small.”); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 443 (noting that “standard 
terms cover events that are unlikely to occur”). 
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V. Toward Enforceable Boilerplate 
We now know that once a transaction reaches a certain level 
of complexity, consumers simply will not read boilerplate. The 
functioning market that forms the basis for boilerplate’s 
enforceability is thus largely an illusion, particularly when one 
considers the full verticality of the transactions that consumers 
encounter in the real world. No informed minority rescues 
nonreading consumers. And reputational concerns will not 
reliably constrain sellers from enforcing the boilerplate. 
So where do we go from here? In the following discussion, I 
first review the two solutions at the extreme: enforcing no 
boilerplate and enforcing all of it. I then suggest a pair of 
solutions that fall in between the extremes. The first of the two is 
the more conventional in that it operates within existing 
unconscionability doctrine, but it reforms the doctrine using 
insights from the verticality approach. The second is my more 
radical, “forced salience” mechanism, which makes sellers and 
consumers alike confront boilerplate’s information costs—and, by 
confronting them, minimize them. 
A. Two Extremes 
1. Get Rid of All Boilerplate 
The most extreme solution to the boilerplate problem would 
be to refuse to allow sellers to even include boilerplate in any 
transaction of minimal complexity, or at least to declare it all 
unenforceable. Given the evidence of market failure, this 
approach is not as crazy as it first sounds. Yet it goes too far 
because even a one-sided boilerplate term is sometimes efficient. 
When that’s the case, undoing a term would be worse than 
preserving it. 
To understand why some one-sided boilerplate is worth 
preserving, one must appreciate that boilerplate presents an 
example of the classic market for lemons.134 Although consumers 
                                                                                                     
 134. For the original conception of the lemons theory, see George A. Akerlof, 
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 
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do not usually consider boilerplate terms when making a 
purchase, they do pay attention to other features of the product; 
indeed, the whole point of satisficing is that certain features are 
ignored so that others can be considered. So some features (such 
as price, presumably) will be salient even though others (such as 
boilerplate) will not. Thus the lemons problem: sellers will 
decrease the quality of the nonsalient features and use the 
resulting savings to make the salient features more attractive.135 
Boilerplate, as a nonsalient feature, will accordingly be full of 
terms that reduce seller costs and shift risks to consumers, and 
sellers will use the money they save to lower the price of the 
product.136 Commentators have observed this dynamic in the 
adhesive contract terms that accompany products as diverse as 
cell-phone plans,137 bank accounts,138 and credit cards,139 and 
some empirics for the software industry lend support to its 
presence as well.140 
If the lemons effect consistently shifts boilerplate’s costs and 
risks to consumers, without any informed consent on their part, 
why would boilerplate ever be worth preserving? The answer is 
that sometimes consumers can bear those costs and risks more 
                                                                                                     
Q.J. ECON. 488, 488–500 (1970). For those who first applied it to boilerplate, see 
Beales et al., supra note 95, at 510–11; Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 244 & n.158 
For the most thorough explanation of boilerplate’s lemons dynamic, see 
Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1206. 
 135. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1206 (“[M]arket competition actually will 
force sellers to provide low-quality non-salient attributes in order to save costs 
that will be passed along to buyers in the form of lower prices.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 49, 52–53 (2009). 
 138. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 244. 
 139. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1401–02 
(2004). For Bar-Gill, the nonsalience of credit-card terms is rooted in behavioral 
biases, rather than in information costs, but the effect is the same: consumers 
routinely discount certain features of the transaction, which gives sellers an 
incentive to reduce their quality so as to improve the more salient features. Id. 
at 1400–01. 
 140. Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6, at 680 (studying 
647 software contracts from 598 different companies and 114 distinct markets 
and finding that they were “almost without exception tilted toward the seller, 
relative to the relevant default rules—some sharply so”). 
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efficiently than sellers. As Russell Korobkin explains, a “low 
quality” boilerplate term (i.e., a term that favors sellers over 
consumers) is not necessarily an inefficient one.141 There are 
some pro-seller terms to which a fully informed consumer would 
want to agree because the resulting savings in price would be 
greater than the cost of the term to the consumer.142 For example, 
a software company might realize substantial savings if it could 
contractually limit installation of its programs to one computer 
per customer. Such a term would arguably be “low quality,” in 
that it constrains consumers,143 but many consumers might 
nevertheless be happy to accept it because they never planned to 
install the program on multiple machines and so can pay a lower 
price without giving up much in return. 
In short, if a term is efficient, it should be enforced whether 
it emerges by sheer luck from a dysfunctional market for lemons 
or by design from a functioning market with robust competition 
and universal salience of product features. The alternative is to 
allow consumers to have their cake and eat it too—i.e., to enjoy 
the lower price but then escape enforcement of the term. Faced 
with that possibility, sellers would change the boilerplate to 
allocate such risks to themselves, inefficiently, and charge higher 
prices to make up for it.144 Such an outcome would do no favors 
for seller or consumer. 
                                                                                                     
 141. Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1283. Korobkin also points out that the 
lemons effect can hurt sellers as well as consumers because it prevents sellers 
from competing on nonsalient features. Id. at 1206. Indeed, the main 
contribution of the lemons theory is to show how high-quality products are 
driven out of the marketplace whenever quality is not salient. See Akerlof, supra 
note 134, at 489–90 (explaining the lemons theory through the market for used 
cars).  
 142. See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1222 (“[C]osts saved by shifting risks to the 
customer via form terms may well be returned to the customer by means of 
lower prices.”). 
 143. Query whether copyright law already provides that constraint in 
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006), which forbids unauthorized reproduction of 
copyrighted works. But consumers might have a defense in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair 
use doctrine) or 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (limited usage license for owner of 
computer program). 
 144. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1213 (explaining that, if courts would 
refuse to enforce market-efficient terms, “the majority of resulting contracts 
would be inefficient and the majority of buyers made worse off”). 
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2. Enforce All Boilerplate 
The solution at the other extreme is to enforce all boilerplate, 
information costs or not, because we can’t do without it. This is a 
common response of boilerplate’s defenders to the information 
cost problem; they admit its shortcomings but nonetheless insist 
on its inevitability, under the assumption that transactions 
cannot proceed unless they are governed by reams of unread 
contracts. Eric Posner—one of ProCD’s few champions in the 
legal academy—bases his support for the case on such an 
argument: “Contracts are long and detailed by necessity. To sell 
goods, manufacturers need to be able to put just the crucial terms 
on the box (such as the price) along with useful information, and 
to omit information of little use to consumers, including obvious 
information.”145 And Judge Easterbrook, the author of ProCD, 
envisions only two possible worlds: one in which consumers pay 
now but get the terms later, and another in which cashiers read 
pages of contracts to customers before ringing up sales, in a 
“droning voice [that] would anesthetize rather than enlighten 
many potential buyers.”146 
This insistence on boilerplate’s importance is overblown. 
Consider my Toshiba computer purchase. If all 96,641 words of 
boilerplate disappeared from that transaction, the heavens would 
not fall. Instead, default rules would fill in the blanks, and the 
transaction would proceed with surprisingly little disruption. In 
place of Toshiba customer service contracts, I would have an 
implied warranty of merchantability and express warranties 
based on statements Toshiba made about its goods.147 In place of 
                                                                                                     
 145. Posner, supra note 27, at 1183. 
 146. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(Easterbrook, J.). 
 147. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977) (implied warranty of merchantability); id. § 2-
313 (express warranties). Note that the warranty of merchantability allows for 
some variation in the quality of goods and that the generally accepted practice 
in the relevant industry is a major factor in determining merchantability. See 
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 752 F. Supp. 181, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1990) 
(“Acceptance in the trade . . . has long been a reliable barometer for determining 
whether a particular product is merchantable.”), aff’d in relevant part, rev’d in 
irrelevant part, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). Therefore, given the bugs that one 
encounters as a matter of course when dealing with computers, one would not 
expect the warranty to have much force. For example, the Step-Saver court held 
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Microsoft’s licenses, I would rely on the Copyright Act’s limited 
grant of user privileges to software purchasers.148 Instead of 
arbitrating various disputes with sellers, I would use the court 
system. And so forth. 
This is not to say that a transaction can always proceed if the 
associated contracts disappear. To the contrary, in some 
instances contractual terms are essential, and getting rid of them 
would accordingly mean getting rid of the entire transaction. For 
example, no default rule will be able to tell me how soon I must 
return my rental car; a specific contractual term would be 
needed. Such essential terms, however, are generally not hidden 
in boilerplate. Rather, they tend to be presented up front, in a 
salient context, often with an array of options from which the 
consumer is forced to consciously choose. No one rents a car 
without having made a deliberate choice about the rental period. 
Or consider my computer purchase, in which the website walked 
me through the options for a number of important features, both 
contractual (shipping terms, service plan, extended warranty) 
and noncontractual (monitor, memory, size of hard drive). None 
of these web pages presented me with any boilerplate, and none 
of them was included in the boilerplate tally. Getting rid of the 
boilerplate would thus not have destroyed the transaction.149 
The prospect of unenforceable boilerplate does, however, 
draw attention to the importance of formulating appropriate 
default rules to fill the gap that unenforceable boilerplate would 
leave. The traditional view of default rules holds that they merely 
insert into the contract whatever term the parties would most 
likely have negotiated themselves—i.e., the efficient term.150 
                                                                                                     
that computer hardware’s incompatibility with popular software did not violate 
the merchantability standard. Id. The software programs in question included 
WordPerfect (which qualified as popular back in the early 1990s despite its 
near-moribund existence today). 
 148. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a). 
 149. Cf. Preston & McCann, supra note 71, at 9 (commenting on ProCD by 
observing that “the seven-by-nine-by-three-inch box in which software is sold 
would provide plenty of space if the terms were limited to the reasonable 
number of terms necessary to protect intellectual property written in plain 
English”). 
 150. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 120 (calling for gap-filling default 
rules that “mimic the terms that the parties would have incorporated”); Frank 
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Modern scholarship, however, has revealed that substituting an 
inefficient term can sometimes be better because it forces a party 
to reveal welfare-enhancing information.151 Attractive as that 
prospect might be in some cases, it is exactly the wrong approach 
to take for boilerplate terms because the whole point of the 
boilerplate problem is that consumers already have more 
information than they can deal with.152 This suggests that when 
the possibility of unenforceable boilerplate is significant, the 
applicable default rule should be formulated based on the 
traditional gap-filling theory. Otherwise, we end up with the 
worst of both worlds: an unenforceable contract term displaced by 
an inefficient default rule. 
In short, getting rid of all boilerplate is too extreme, but so is 
preserving all boilerplate. Therefore, the correct legal solution 
must appreciate that some boilerplate is good for consumers, even 
if produced by a dysfunctional market, and that doing away with 
boilerplate will not necessarily explode the transaction, as long as 
the law remains attentive to filling the resulting gap with 
appropriate default rules. With those caveats in mind, let us turn 
to a pair of more promising solutions to the boilerplate problem. 
                                                                                                     
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1433 (1989) (calling for gap-filling default rules that “duplicate the terms 
the parties would have selected”); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The 
Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 
VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (calling for gap-filling default rules that “mimic the 
agreements contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to bargain out 
each detail of the transaction”). 
 151. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97–100 (1989) 
(discussing penalty default rules and arguing that inefficient default contract 
terms should be enforced against the party that possesses more information, 
thus encouraging both information sharing and explicit “contract[ing] around” 
the inefficient rules). Ayres and Gertner also discuss using defaults to 
incentivize the sharing of information with third parties, such as courts, rather 
than with the other contracting party. Id. at 95–98. Those defaults are less 
relevant here. 
 152. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing consumers’ cognitive limitations and 
the problem of information overload). 
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B. Two In-Betweens 
Having rejected the solutions at the two extremes, let us now 
consider two approaches in between. The first is to use verticality 
to adjust contract law’s well-known approach to adhesion 
contracts—namely, the unconscionability doctrine—so as to 
better contextualize its inquiry and properly allocate its burdens 
of proof. The second is to directly require sellers to lower the 
information costs that their boilerplate imposes, both by making 
it more salient and by reducing its overall volume. 
1. Unconscionability 
When concerns about boilerplate arise, contract law turns to 
the unconscionability doctrine.153 The unconscionability analysis 
focuses on whether there were defects in the bargaining process 
(procedural unconscionability) and on whether the resulting 
contract contains grossly one-sided terms (substantive 
unconscionability).154 Some courts will invalidate a contract only 
                                                                                                     
 153. To be sure, there are other applicable doctrines, such as the “reasonable 
expectations” doctrine, see, e.g., Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406, 414 
(N.J. 1985) (ruling that consent to an insurance contract “can be inferred only to 
the extent that the policy language conforms to public expectations and 
commercially reasonable standards”), and the Restatement’s rule for 
standardized agreements, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) 
(1981) (“Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting 
such assent would not do so if he knew that the [standardized] writing 
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”). But as 
Russell Korobkin points out, both doctrines suffer from infirmities similar to 
those of unconscionability, and in any event, they “appear to have been almost 
completely forgotten by courts, at least outside of the realm of insurance 
contracts.” Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1270–71. In any event, to the extent that 
these doctrines remain appealing, they can easily be folded into my substantive 
unconscionability proposal. 
 154. The distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability 
originated in Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s 
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (referring to “bargaining 
naughtiness as ‘procedural unconscionability’” and to “evils in the resulting 
contract as ‘substantive unconscionability’”) and has become a staple of the case 
law. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 
2003) (discussing Ohio law); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (not using the terms “procedural” and 
“substantive,” but explaining that “[u]nconscionability has generally been 
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when they find both kinds of unconscionability,155 whereas others 
are satisfied with just one of the two subcategories.156 The 
following proposal requires proof of both but makes a small 
adjustment to procedural unconscionability and a bigger 
adjustment to substantive unconscionability. In combination, 
these changes would go a long way toward addressing the 
infirmities in the way contract law approaches boilerplate. 
Start with procedural unconscionability. As Russell Korobkin 
points out, the procedural inquiry asks whether the allegedly 
unconscionable term was presented in such a way as to attract 
the reader’s attention—was it on the first page? was it in 
boldface?157—but ignores the fact that cognitively overburdened 
consumers might fail to process even a prominent term.158 In 
contrast, Korobkin observes, a better procedural unconscionability 
analysis would not be satisfied with examining whether a 
boilerplate term was prominent, but would instead directly address 
whether it was salient to consumers as a class.159 
What does verticality add to this conversation? Context. In 
order to determine whether a term is truly salient, courts must 
look beyond the four corners of the contract itself and consider 
                                                                                                     
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the 
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the 
other party”). 
 155. See, e.g., Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 
(N.Y. 1988) (“A determination of unconscionability generally requires that a 
contract was both procedurally and substantially unconscionable when 
made . . . .”). 
 156. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) 
(concluding that “a claim of unconscionability can be established with a showing 
of substantive unconscionability alone”). 
 157. See, e.g., Russell v. Performance Toyota, Inc., 826 So. 2d 719, 726 (Miss. 
2002) (enforcing an arbitration clause “preceded by boldface and capitalized 
headings”); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Leggett, 744 So. 2d 890, 895–98 (Ala. 
1999) (enforcing an arbitration clause appearing in upper-case letters in the 
“boxed-in” part of a contract). 
 158. Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1272–73. Procedural unconscionability has 
other failings as well. See id. at 1258–68. Most relevant here, however, is its 
overly narrow emphasis on prominence of the term at issue. 
 159. See id. at 1279–83 (arguing that salience is the key feature of 
procedural unconscionability and calling for courts to “initially inquire into 
whether a challenged term is salient or non-salient” prior to “considering the 
possibility of invalidating a form contract term”). 
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the entire transaction from start to finish, with all its information 
costs. A term may be unresponsive to market forces, 
notwithstanding its prominence, if it arrives after the consumer 
has invested considerable time in the purchase (the acquisition 
cost issue) or has concentrated his or her limited attention on 
other product features (the processing cost issue). And a term 
that is not prominent may nonetheless be salient if it is an 
important part of the transaction, regardless of how 
inconspicuous it seems in the abstract. 
Requiring courts to relax their focus on the particular text of 
the boilerplate and account for the big picture is not a radical 
change, and in fact is consistent with the rhetoric of procedural 
unconscionability jurisprudence. The consumer’s “age, education, 
intelligence, [and] business acumen and experience” are all 
relevant, at least in theory, to the procedural issue,160 as is the 
“commercial setting, purpose, and effect” of the contract.161 The 
law thus already calls for a contextualization of sorts. Yet in 
practice, factors like age and setting are difficult to weigh with 
any certainty, which is why courts tend to give them lip service 
and then focus on the text of the contract itself. Measuring 
boilerplate’s information costs, however, is much easier; evidence 
of word count, late-arriving terms, and related factors should be 
readily available to consumer and seller alike, and courts can 
evaluate that evidence in light of the emerging empirical findings 
on consumers’ cognitive limitations when dealing with 
boilerplate.162 
                                                                                                     
 160. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 837 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)); accord 
Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 504 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Morrison, 
317 F.3d at 666); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 
& n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (stating that lack of education and “ignorance of 
arithmetic” are factors a court should consider); Layne v. Garner, 612 So. 2d 
404, 408 (Ala. 1992) (examining whether a party is “unsophisticated and/or 
uneducated”). 
 161. Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985). 
 162. Korobkin would place the burden of proving nonsalience on the party 
that wishes to invalidate the term because all salient terms and some 
nonsalient terms are efficient. Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1280. Given the 
mounting evidence that boilerplate goes unread by nearly everyone, this should 
not be a particularly hard burden to bear. The key issue, then, is not who should 
bear the burden of proving procedural unconscionability; the question is 
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This simple expedient of adding vertical context to the 
analysis would result in more frequent findings of procedural 
unconscionability. But it would not upend boilerplate entirely. 
When information costs were low, as in the purchase of a 
straightforward product accompanied by a short contract, then 
the law would expect consumers to read the terms and register 
their individual preferences. Enforceability would merely scale 
with overall transactional complexity—and appropriately so. 
Next, consider substantive unconscionability. Context is an 
important but overlooked factor here as well. A term may appear 
one-sided in isolation, but if the seemingly oppressed party got 
something more valuable in return (e.g., a significant price 
reduction), then invalidating the term would upset an efficient 
bargain. The inverse is also true: a term that appears reasonable 
on its face may in fact be oppressive if one party unilaterally 
imposed it on the other with no concomitant benefit.163 In short, 
by examining terms in isolation, rather than in the overall 
bargaining context, substantive unconscionability fails to weigh 
the costs and benefits of the transaction as a whole.164 
As Korobkin has pointed out, a better substantive 
unconscionability inquiry would focus not on whether the term at 
issue imposes a cost on the consumer, or on how high that cost is, 
but on whether imposing that cost on the consumer is efficient—
whether it increases the parties’ joint wealth.165 As we saw in the 
lemons discussion above, unread boilerplate shifts costs to 
consumers as a matter of course, but such shifting is welfare-
enhancing only when the consumer is the party better able to 
bear the risk. Therefore, to determine whether the term is “fair” 
to the consumer (as the substantive unconscionability analysis 
                                                                                                     
whether courts will come to understand that such proof requires a more holistic 
view of the transaction, in all its complexity. 
 163. See Baird, supra note 10, at 939 (“Advantage-taking through fine print 
is still advantage-taking, even if the stakes are small.”). 
 164. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1273–74 (calling the courts’ failure to 
conduct a true cost–benefit analysis “the glaring flaw in substantive 
unconscionability jurisprudence”). 
 165. See id. at 1283 (“[A]s part of their ‘substantive unconscionability’ 
analysis, courts should examine whether the benefits of a low-quality term to 
the seller in the form of savings in production, distribution, and sales costs 
exceed the value of an alternative term to potential buyers.”). 
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purports to do), one must determine which party can most 
cheaply bear the risk being shifted.166 
Courts rarely make this determination, but there are 
exceptions. For example, the court in A&M Produce Co. v. FMC 
Corp.167 evaluated a disclaimer of all warranties for agricultural 
equipment. Noting that “risk of loss is most appropriately borne 
by the party best able to prevent its occurrence,” the court ruled 
that the disclaimer was substantively unconscionable, 
determining that the seller could bear the risk of its own 
equipment’s failings more efficiently than the inexperienced 
buyer.168 
Granted, a cost–benefit analysis of this sort can be difficult. 
Even when a court knows that a boilerplate term is nonsalient, 
and has therefore already found procedural unconscionability, it 
will often be unclear whether a boilerplate term’s imposition of 
costs or risks on the consumer is efficient.169 This means that the 
outcome will often depend on which party bears the burden of 
proof. 
Korobkin suggests that the consumer should bear this 
burden (i.e., should have to prove that a boilerplate term is 
inefficient) because he is concerned that efficient terms might 
otherwise be thrown out—the danger of false positives.170 Here, 
however, Korobkin and I disagree. Assigning burdens of proof 
generally is a function of two factors: (1) the probability of the 
event to be proved and (2) which party has better access to the 
                                                                                                     
 166. Id. at 1283–84. 
 167. A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1982), cited in Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1277. 
 168. A&M Produce Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (“Rarely would the buyer be in 
a better position than the manufacturer-seller to evaluate the performance 
characteristics of a machine.”). 
 169. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1274–76 (revealing the complexities of 
such an inquiry through examples of arbitration clauses); cf. PUBLIC CITIZEN, 
THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 2 
(2007) (arguing that credit-card arbitration agreements disfavor consumers). 
 170. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1285 (calling for an “implicit 
presumption against invalidating terms”). 
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relevant evidence.171 Regarding the first factor, we simply do not 
know how frequently boilerplate contains inefficient terms. 
Korobkin is certainly right that there is a danger of false 
positives if sellers bear the admittedly difficult burden of proving 
efficiency.172 But there is a danger of false negatives if the 
consumer bears the burden of proving inefficiency, and it is 
impossible to know which danger is greater.173 
Given this uncertainty, the better basis for assignment of the 
burden is to look to the second factor: which party has better 
access to evidence about the matter to be proved?174 In the 
boilerplate context, that party is the seller. After all, the seller is 
the party that drafted the term in question, and of the two parties 
it is the only one that fully internalizes the boilerplate’s 
information costs. So the seller presumably had a reason for 
allocating costs and risks as it did. If the reason is that the 
chosen allocation increases the parties’ joint wealth, then the 
seller can so demonstrate. If, however, the reason is that the 
lemons dynamic forced it to inefficiently offload costs on the 
consumer through nonsalient means, then forcing the seller to 
prove efficiency not only leads to the correct result in the case at 
hand, but it also helps solve the lemons problem going forward 
and thus increases overall market efficiency. 
In sum, two changes to the unconscionability doctrine can 
help remedy the problems with boilerplate that this Article has 
identified. First, as always, the consumer must prove procedural 
unconscionability by showing that the disputed term was not 
                                                                                                     
 171. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (John W. Strong gen’l ed., 5th ed. 
1999); Bruce L. Hay and Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: 
An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 413, 418–19 (1997). 
 172. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1285 (arguing that false positives occur 
because courts have difficulty weighing “industry-wide benefits and costs in the 
context of an individual dispute”). 
 173. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 827 (“[I]n the context of civil liability, 
there is no reason to prefer one danger over the other.”). 
 174. JAMES FLEMING JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 344 (4th ed. 1992) (“The 
burden of proof traditionally is placed on the party having the readier access to 
knowledge about the fact in question.”); MCCORMICK, supra note 171, § 337 (“A 
doctrine often repeated by the courts is that where the facts with regard to an 
issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of 
proving the issue.”). 
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salient—but this inquiry should take into account emerging 
empirical evidence and the full context of the overall transaction. 
Second, if the consumer satisfies this burden, then the burden on 
the issue of substantive unconscionability shifts to the seller, who 
must show that the term was efficient. Failure to do so means the 
term is unenforceable. 
2. Forced Salience 
Changing the unconscionability doctrine is an attractive 
approach to the boilerplate problem, not least because it works 
within an existing and familiar contract law construct. Its 
application, however, is likely to be infrequent because an 
unconscionability analysis arises only in those rare instances in 
which the parties have begun suing each other. In addition, its 
effect will be indirect because it encourages, rather than explicitly 
requires, boilerplate to be responsive to the market. 
Is there a more direct and universal approach to boilerplate’s 
information costs problem—one that would fix the marketplace 
rather than supplant it? Consider again the two aspects of the 
information costs problem: the acquisition cost and the processing 
cost. Reducing acquisition cost is a matter of making the 
boilerplate more immediately accessible to consumers, such as 
through a disclosure requirement, so that they are better able to 
make a rational decision.175 Yet even when the acquisition cost is 
reduced to zero—i.e., even when the adhesive terms are readily 
                                                                                                     
 175. A number of commentators have accordingly suggested solving the 
boilerplate problem through early, mandatory disclosure. See, e.g., Braucher, 
Decision to Trust the Courts, supra note 29, at 755–56 (criticizing “the practice 
of holding back terms for mass-market products . . . even when it would be easy 
to provide them in advance” and arguing that “[t]he customer has a right to 
know what the product is before deciding whether to order it); Braucher, 
Delayed Disclosure, supra note 78, at 1860–62 (calling for “require[d] disclosure 
of key terms in software licenses,” and presenting data that only 12.5% of 
surveyed software companies disclosed their license agreement prior to 
requiring payment online); Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending 
Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 104 (2011) (describing 
mandatory disclosure as a “safe harbor” for sellers). 
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available—consumers still face the processing cost, which in a 
complex transaction can pose just as big a problem.176 
Requiring early disclosure is therefore not enough; it is a 
necessary but not sufficient part of the solution whenever the 
transaction as a whole is complex enough to impose considerable 
information processing costs. Any solution must also reduce 
processing costs. And until scientists develop a way to improve 
human cognition, processing costs are going to remain a function 
of the total amount of information presented.177 There is, 
however, a regulatory approach that would lower both acquisition 
and processing costs, and it is revealed by examining the 
verticality of the computer purchase described above. 
The computer purchases involved plenty of product features, 
both contractual and noncontractual, that were not presented as 
take-it-or-leave-it propositions. For example, the Dell website 
guided me through an array of options on such matters as the 
amount of memory, size of the hard drive, shipping terms, in-
home service plan, and extended warranty—with one web page 
dedicated to each such feature. Indeed, the website all but forced 
me to choose between those options, with corresponding costs or 
savings depending on the choices I made.178 
                                                                                                     
 176. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) 
(“Meaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it describes a 
balance between ‘competing considerations of complete disclosure . . . and the 
need to avoid . . . [informational overload.]’” (alterations in original) (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 96-73, at 3 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 280, 281)); Ben-
Shahar & Schneider, supra note 41, at 688 (noting that “incomplete disclosure 
leaves people ignorant, but complete disclosure creates crushing overload 
problems”). Indeed, relying on disclosure as the sole solution to the information 
costs problem actually makes things worse because it blinds courts to the 
processing problem and prompts them to enforce any disclosed term, no matter 
how nonsalient it may be. See Hillman, supra note 1, at 839 (noting that 
increased disclosure “may backfire . . . because it may not increase reading or 
shopping for terms or motivate businesses to draft reasonable ones, but instead, 
may make heretofore suspect terms more likely enforceable”). 
 177. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1246 (“[C]ontractual inefficiency results 
primarily from suboptimal information processing rather than from incomplete 
information.”). 
 178. I was not literally forced to go through each and every feature because 
there was a “Finish[] Personalizing” option on each screen that would have 
skipped right to the order confirmation process—although even then I would 
have had to make choices with regard to terms such as shipping and payment. 
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Suppose that the law required Dell to force me to review all 
the contractual terms this way, rather than just the very few that 
it deemed worthy of inclusion up front? By making me confront 
each term before submitting any payment, Dell would be solving 
the information acquisition problem. And by not allowing me to 
skip the boilerplate, Dell would at least be increasing the odds 
that my attention would focus on the transaction’s contractual 
features, thus addressing the information processing problem.179 
One can imagine more or less intrusive versions of this 
requirement. For example, the law could merely require 
consumers to click “I agree” with regard to each individual 
contract term. Or the law could require sellers to offer options 
with real consequences (in terms of costs or savings) and force 
consumers to select among them. Those approaches, however, 
would likely produce little real increase in salience; a consumer 
overloaded with information would just mindlessly click through, 
selecting options without really making choices.180 Information 
acquisition would occur, but information processing would not. 
More effective would be to require the website to really force 
the consumer to read—e.g., by scrolling the text line by line, at a 
slow speed, or otherwise preventing the consumer from advancing 
to the next term until a set period of time had elapsed.181 This 
approach, which I call “forced salience,” helps solve the 
boilerplate problem in two ways. The most obvious is that by 
presenting each term up front and making the consumer confront 
                                                                                                     
 179. There is some empirical evidence that offering a consumer options can 
increase the rate of acceptance of a contract. E.g., Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 
128, at 305. 
 180. See Hillman & Barakat, supra note 105, at 26 (speculating that “extra 
clicking would be cumbersome for little gain because consumers would simply 
click without digesting the disclaimer”); Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 175, at 
108 (considering a requirement that consumers click “I agree” but deciding that 
it “ultimately may not promote any additional reading anyway”); Korobkin, 
supra note 1, at 1246 (dismissing the “specific assent requirement”). 
 181. One might combine this approach with a “plain English” requirement, 
so that the now unavoidable boilerplate could actually be comprehended. 
Masson and Waldron had some success in increasing consumer comprehension 
through simplified diction and sentence structure. See Masson & Waldron, 
supra note 84, at 71–72, 75–76 (finding a significant increase in study 
participants’ ability to answer questions and correctly paraphrase prepositional 
phrases after reading the “plain-language” version of a contract). 
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it before moving on, it directly seeks to reduce the costs of 
information acquisition and information processing.182 If this 
results in compensatory consumer decisionmaking, great; the 
boilerplate problem is solved and the market properly registers 
the consumer’s preferences. 
But would forced salience really result in significantly more 
reading of boilerplate? Perhaps not. Even if reading did not 
increase, however, this approach would address the boilerplate 
problem in a second, more subtle way. Consider that, as a 
consumer, your first reaction to forced salience is probably to 
scream in horror at the prospect of sitting through all of that 
boilerplate. It’s the digital equivalent of Judge Easterbrook’s 
“droning voice” that would “anesthetize rather than enlighten.”183 
Yet this seeming liability is in fact an asset because, by adding 
new costs—i.e., time and frustration—to each contract term in 
the transaction, forced salience effectively imposes a tax on 
bloated boilerplate.184 Sellers know that consumers have limited 
time, limited cognitive abilities, and low thresholds for 
                                                                                                     
 182. Empirics suggest that reducing the length of click-wrap contracts 
increases comprehension and may increase readership. See Plaut & Bartlett, 
supra note 128, at 302–04 (finding 11% overall comprehension increase in all 
test contracts, but finding significant increase in readership time in only two of 
the six contracts). Reducing length also increases the likelihood that the 
consumer will reject the contract, suggesting that some expression of 
preferences due to increased comprehension might be occurring. See id. at 304–
05 (suggesting that shorter contracts most likely allowed study participants to 
understand and analyze the terms). Note, however, that the contracts being 
tested by Plaut and Bartlett were associated with a free product. See id. at 301 
(registering for and using online music website). Such contracts tend to have 
more readers than priced products. See Bakos et al., supra note 109, at 34 
(pointing out that “consumers may fear that there is a ‘catch’ in products offered 
for free”). 
 183. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(Easterbrook, J.). 
 184. Indeed, if one was interested only in this aspect of the forced salience 
approach, one could achieve it directly by taxing each word of boilerplate. 
(Thanks to Fred Yen for pointing this out.) One might also view forced salience 
as a classic formality, a “check against inconsiderate action,” which focuses 
parties’ attention on the legal consequences of their actions. See Baird, supra 
note 10, at 944 (“It is much cheaper to sign a document than to melt wax and 
use a signet ring. But this is the point.”); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and 
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941) (describing formalities’ “cautionary 
function”). 
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frustration. This means that sellers will respond to a forced 
salience requirement by reducing the overall volume of contract 
terms to the bare minimum, thus reducing information overload 
and increasing the chances that the remaining terms can truly be 
processed.185 
In other words, forced salience makes consumers confront the 
reality of boilerplate’s information costs, and the result is that 
sellers can no longer lade the transaction with as much 
boilerplate as they please. Instead, sellers will have to make a 
call about how badly they want each term to be part of the 
transaction. The inevitable paring of boilerplate to its essentials, 
and the resulting reduction in sheer volume of terms, would serve 
to make it easier for consumers to process those terms that 
survive. Even when forced salience fails, it succeeds. 
Forced salience is an admittedly radical solution to the 
boilerplate problem. This Article has demonstrated, however, 
that the problem itself is radical and is radically 
underappreciated. Taking half-hearted measures will not restore 
integrity to so dysfunctional a market. Forcing the market to 
confront its dysfunction will. 
VI. Conclusion 
Consumers do not encounter boilerplate in the abstract. They 
encounter it in the course of real-world transactions. And in the 
real world, the information costs of boilerplate loom large. 
This Article has accordingly presented the results of a first-
ever study of the information costs that boilerplate imposes on 
                                                                                                     
 185. One might also seek to reduce complexity to more manageable levels by 
regulating the noncontractual features of a transaction and their associated 
information costs. In a sense, the law already does so through product liability, 
false advertising law, and similar consumer-oriented regulation. But contractual 
features are a low-hanging fruit; it is comparatively simple to reduce complexity 
by declaring a contract term unenforceable—or at least that is the sort of 
regulation in which the law routinely engages. It is a much different proposition 
to reduce complexity through regulation of noncontractual product features (for 
example, requiring computer vendors to offer hard drives in only one size or a 
set number of USB ports). See Grether et al., supra note 10, at 289 (“[T]o limit 
the number of products that firms could sell or the number of attributes that 
products could have would require a costly, complex regulatory process.”). 
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consumers as they make their way through an actual 
transaction—a fully contextualized, vertical experience. Its 
findings are that, in a typical computer purchase, those costs are 
so high as to be insuperable. They loom so large that real-world 
consumers have little choice but to disregard boilerplate entirely. 
The solution to the information cost problem is neither to 
forbid all use of boilerplate nor to permit its indiscriminate use. 
Instead, the key lies in appreciating that, just as a contextualized 
analysis reveals the full scope of the problem, so can a 
contextualized solution solve it. The proper regulatory 
approaches thus involve changing existing contract doctrine to 
take into account the informational challenges that boilerplate 
actually presents, or incentivizing market actors to confront those 
costs and, by doing so, minimize them. 
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VII: Appendix A—Summary of Results 
Table 1: Summary of Results186 




. . . 
overall 
. . . at 
purchase 
. . . at 
computer 
startup 
. . . at 
program 
startup 
. . . 
per $ 
Acer 12 33,128 9,135 23,993 0 47.1 
Dell 29 78,203 9,765 24,165 44,273 84.7 
HP 25 79,340 0 24,328 55,012 103.4 
Toshiba 27 96,641 18,678 34,744 43,219 131.5 
Total 93 287,312 37,578 107,230 142,504  
Total 








Average 23.25 71,828 9,394 26,807 35,626 91.7 
Weighted 









                                                                                                     
 186. Weighted averages are based on the market share set forth supra note 
63. 
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VIII: APPENDIX B—BOILERPLATE BREAKDOWN 
  
 ACER PURCHASE








1 Standard Terms of Sale 3,005 At purchase 
2 Limited Warranty Agreement 3,353 At purchase 
3 Legal 665 Incorporated in 1 
4 Products & Services 136 Incorporated in 3 
5 Privacy 1,972 Incorporated in 1 
6 Contacts 4 Incorporated in 5 
7 End User License Agreement 1,487 Computer startup 








8 License Terms, Windows 7 Home Premium 5,115 Computer startup 
9 Windows 7 Privacy Statement 784 Incorporated in 8 
10 Windows 7 Privacy Supplement 14,872 Incorporated in 8 
11 .NET Framework Benchmark Testing Terms 429 Incorporated in 10 
12 Privacy Statement for the Microsoft Error Reporting Service 1,306 Incorporated in 10 
  Microsoft Subtotal: 22,506 5 contracts  
   ACER PURCHASE TOTAL 33,128 12 contracts 
 
 DELL PURCHASE








1 Terms and Conditions of Sale 2,339 At purchase 
2 Return Policy 700 Incorporated in 1 
3 Site Terms 1,077 Incorporated in 1 
4 Warranties 5,649 Incorporated in 1 
5 Notice for Dell End User Software License Agreement 78 Computer startup 
6 Software License Agreement 1,581 Computer startup; incorporated in 7 
7 DataSafe Online: Terms and Conditions 2,799 DataSafe startup 
8 Privacy Policy 1,665 Incorporated in 7 
9 Change of Address/Request Catalog/Mailing List Removal 256 Incorporated in 8 
10 Security 1,051 Incorporated in 8 
  Dell Subtotal: 17,195 10 contracts 
 
  [Dell Purchase continued on next page] 
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 DELL PURCHASE











11 License Terms, Windows 7 Home Premium 
5,115 Computer startup 
12 Windows 7 Privacy Statement 784 Incorporated in 11 
13 Windows 7 Privacy Supplement 14,872 Incorporated in 11 
14 .NET Framework Benchmark Testing Terms 
429 Incorporated in 11 
15 Privacy Statement for the Microsoft Error Reporting Service 
1,306 Incorporated in 13 
16 Software License Terms—Office 2010 Desktop Application Software 
2,819 Office Starter 
startup 
17 Genuine Microsoft Software Program Privacy Statement 
911 Incorporated in 16 
18 Privacy Statement for Office 2010 4,994 Incorporated in 16 
19 Use of Microsoft Copyrighted Content 
1,628 Incorporated in 16 
and 22 
20 Privacy Supplement for Office Starter 455 Incorporated in 18 
21 Trademark Guidelines 47 Incorporated in 19 
22 Service Agreement 10,444 
Internet Explorer 
startup; 
Incorporated in 19 
23 Online Privacy Statement 4,614 Incorporated in 22 
24 Anti-Spam Policy 464 Incorporated in 22 
25 Authorized 3rd Party Software and Services 130 Incorporated in 22 





26 Warranty Disclaimer and Software License Agreement 
3,438 Reader startup 
27 Online Privacy Policy 4,551 Incorporated in 26 
28 Adobe.com Opt-Out page 201 Incorporated in 27 





29 End User License Agreement 3,806 Anti-Virus startup 
  McAfee Subtotal: 3,806 1 contract  
   DELL PURCHASE TOTAL 78,203 29 contracts 
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 HP PURCHASE








1 End User License Agreement 1,822 Computer startup 
  HP Subtotal: 1,822 1 contract 







2 License Terms, Windows 7 Home Premium 5,115 Computer startup 
3 Windows 7 Privacy Statement 784 Incorporated in 2 
4 Windows 7 Privacy Supplement 14,872 Incorporated in 2 
5 .NET Framework Benchmark Testing Terms 429 Incorporated in 2 
6 Privacy Statement for the Microsoft Error Reporting Service 1,306 Incorporated in 4 
7 Software License Terms—Office 2010 Desktop Application Software 2,819 
Office Starter 
startup 
8 Genuine Microsoft Software Program Privacy Statement 911 Incorporated in 7 
9 Privacy Statement for Office 2010 4,994 Incorporated in 7 
10 Use of Microsoft Copyrighted Content 1,628 
Incorporated in 7 
and 13 
11 Privacy Supplement for Office Starter 455 Incorporated in 9 
12 Trademark Guidelines 47 Incorporated in 10 
13 Service Agreement 10,444 Incorporated in 10 
14 Online Privacy Statement 4,614 Incorporated in 13 
15 Anti-Spam Policy 464 Incorporated in 13 
16 Authorized 3rd Party Software and Services 130 Incorporated in 13 
  Microsoft Subtotal: 49,012 15 contracts 





17 Software License Agreement 9,217 Premiere Elements startup 
18 Privacy Policy 4,551 Incorporated in 17 
19 Adobe.com Opt-Out page 201 Incorporated in 18 
20 General Terms of Use 8,130 Incorporated in 17 
21 Trademark Information 1,300 Incorporated in 20 
22 Trademark Guidelines 3,001 Incorporated in 22 
23 Trademark Database for General Distribution 1,484 Incorporated in 22 
24 Fonts 101 Incorporated in 17 
25 Flash Runtime Distribution License 521 Incorporated in 17 





   HP PURCHASE TOTAL 79,340 25 contracts 
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 TOSHIBA PURCHASE









1 Terms and Conditions of Sale 2,175 At purchase 
2 NAF Code of Procedure 16,503 Incorporated in 1 
3 Notices 405 Shrinkwrap on computer 
4 Limited Warranty 2,522 Incorporated in 3 
5 JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures 7,282 Incorporated in 4 
6 End User License Agreement 2,029 Computer startup 
7 Eco Utility 847 Eco Utility Startup 
  Toshiba Subtotal: 31,763 7 contracts 







8 License Terms, Windows 7 Home Premium 5,115 Computer startup 
9 Windows 7 Privacy Statement 784 Incorporated in 8 
10 Windows 7 Privacy Supplement 14,872 Incorporated in 8 
11 .NET Framework Benchmark Testing Terms 429 Incorporated in 8 
12 Privacy Statement for the Microsoft Error Reporting Service 1,306 Incorporated in 10 
13 Software License Terms—Office 2010 Desktop Application Software 2,819 
Office Starter 
startup 
14 Genuine Microsoft Software Program Privacy Statement 911 Incorporated in 13 
15 Privacy Statement for Office 2010 4,994 Incorporated in 13 
16 Use of Microsoft Copyrighted Content 1,628 
Incorporated in 13 
and 19 
17 Privacy Supplement for Office Starter 455 Incorporated in 15 
18 Trademark Guidelines 47 Incorporated in 16 
19 Service Agreement 10,444 
Incorporated in 16; 
Live Essentials 
startup 
20 Online Privacy Statement 4,614 Incorporated in 19 
21 Anti-Spam Policy 464 Incorporated in 19 
22 Authorized 3rd Party Software and Services 130 Incorporated in 19 
  Microsoft Subtotal: 49,012 15 contracts 




e 23 Chrome Terms of Service 6,552 Chrome startup 24 Google Privacy Policy 2,240 Incorporated in 26 
25 Key Terms 598 Incorporated in 27 
26 Google Chrome Privacy Notice 3,225 Incorporated in 26 
  Google Subtotal: 12,615 4 contracts  
  [Toshiba Purchase continued on next page] 
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 TOSHIBA PURCHASE









27 Norton License Agreement 3,251 Internet Security startup 
  Norton Subtotal: 3,251 1 contract 
     
   TOSHIBA PURCHASE TOTAL 96,641 27 contracts 
 
  
